The Training of a Public Speaker | Page 3

ought to be, if we were
to conceive an adequate idea of it inseparable from virtue. This he
explains more clearly in his Phædrus, where he says that "The art can
never be perfect without an exact knowledge and strict observance of
justice." I join him in this opinion, and if these were not his real
sentiments, would he have written an apology for Socrates and the
eulogium of those brave citizens who lost their lives in the defense of
their country? This is certainly acting the part of an orator, and if in any
respect he attacks the profession, it is on account of those who make ill
use of eloquence. Socrates, animated with the same spirit, thought it
unworthy of him to pronounce the speech Lysias had composed for his
defense, it being the custom of the orators of those times to write
speeches for arraigned criminals, which the latter pronounced in their
own defense; thus eluding the law that prohibited pleading for another.
Plato, likewise, in his Phædrus, condemns the masters that separated
rhetoric from justice, and preferred probabilities to truth.
Such are the definitions of rhetoric which have been principally set
forth. To go through all of them is not my purpose, nor do I think it
possible, as most writers on arts have shown a perverse dislike for
defining things as others do or in the same terms as those who wrote
before them. I am far from being influenced by a like spirit of ambition,
and far from flattering myself with the glory of invention, and I shall
rest content with that which seems most rational, that rhetoric is
properly defined as "The science of speaking well." Having found what
is best, it is useless to seek further.
Accepting this definition, therefore, it will be no difficult matter to
ascertain its end, for if it be "The science of speaking well," then "to
speak well" will be the end it proposes to itself.
THE USE OF RHETORIC

The next question is on the utility of rhetoric, and from this point of
view some direct the bitterest invectives against it, and what is very
unbecoming, exert the force of eloquence against eloquence, saying
that by it the wicked are freed from punishment, and the innocent
opprest by its artifices; that it perverts good counsel, and enforces bad;
that it foments troubles and seditions in States; that it arms nations
against each other, and makes them irreconcilable enemies; and that its
power is never more manifest than when error and lies triumph over
truth.
Comic poets reproach Socrates with teaching how to make a bad cause
good, and Plato represents Lysias and Gorgias boasting the same thing.
To these may be added several examples of Greeks and Romans, and a
long list of orators whose eloquence was not only the ruin of private
persons, but even destructive to whole cities and republics; and for this
reason it was that eloquence was banished from Sparta and so restricted
at Athens that the orator was not allowed to make appeal to the
passions.
Granting all this as sound argument, we must draw this necessary
inference, that neither generals of armies, nor magistrates, nor medicine,
nor philosophy, will be of any use. Flaminius, an imprudent general,
lost one of our armies. The Gracchi Saturninus, and Glaucia, to raise
themselves to dignity, put Rome into an uproar. Physicians often
administer poisons, and among philosophers some have been found
guilty of the most enormous crimes. Let us not eat of the meats with
which our tables are spread, for meats frequently have caused disease.
Let us never go into houses; they may fall and crush us to death. Let
not our soldiers be armed with swords; a robber may use the same
weapon against us. In short, who does not know that the most necessary
things in life, as air, fire, water, nay, even the celestial bodies, are
sometimes very injurious to our well-being?
But how many examples can be quoted in our favor? Did not Appius
the Blind, by the force of his eloquence dissuade the Senate from
making a shameful peace with Pyrrhus? Did not Cicero's divine
eloquence appear more popular than the Agrarian law he attacked? Did

it not disconcert the audacious measures of Cataline? And did not he,
even in his civil capacity, obtain by it honors that are conferred on only
the most illustrious conquerors? Is it not the orator who strengthens the
soldier's drooping courage, who animates him amidst the greatest
dangers, and inspires him to choose a glorious death rather than a life
of infamy?
The example of the Romans, among whom eloquence always has been
held in the greatest veneration, shall have a higher place in my regard
than that of the Spartans and Athenians.