The Tattva-Muktavali | Page 9

but like the blind hurrying of sheep after the ewe that leads them!

Having made a separate commentary of their own on the Sûtras they
deceive those who follow their doctrine.
95. All these qualities, sovereignty, creation, and the like, eternally
belong to the Supreme Lord; how then can He be "without qualities"
who is thus "possessed of qualities"? he theory of a void of qualities is
mere disputation.
96. The adorable one possesses knowledge, volition, and creative
power; how then can he be destitute of qualities? or, if he is destitute of
qualities, how can he be set forth by the Vedas? How can the absence
of qualities be predicated of the sea of qualities, and yet all
remonstrance be silent? Ponder it well in thine own mind, and then
determine what is right.
97. A substance without attributes, like the sky-flower, is not admitted
either in the Veda or in the world; if the knowledge of such a thing
were derived from the Veda, the Veda itself would then cease to be an
authority.
98. [The Vedântin may reply] "The bunch of Darbha grass [Footnote:
This is the __prastara__ or bundle of sacred grass, which plays an
important part in the sacrificial ritual, cf. Taittirîya S. i. 7. 4,
"__yajamâna.h prastara.h,__" where Sâya.na remarks, "__yajamânavad
yâgasâdhanatvât prastare yajamânatvopachâra.h.__" This description of
the grass as the sacrificer is really only meant as metaphorical praise,
since the actual attributes of the sacrificer are evidently absent from the
grass. (Cf. Mîmâ.msâ Sûtras, i. 4. 23.)] is said to be the sacrificer, as it
is the means of performing the sacrifice; [as the Darbha grass is
understood by this description,] even though the attributes thus ascribed
are not found in it, so is Brahman understood when we ascribe certain
qualities [as 'truth,' etc., even though these qualities are precluded in a
being without qualities]."
99. [I answer] A thorough Vedântin like thee does not accept any where
the existence of qualities or that which possesses qualities; but if
imagined qualities are done away with [by deeper insight], real
qualities are nowhere done away with [Footnote: Clearer insight
abolishes imagined attributes, as __e. g.__ the supposed snake in the
rope; but real attributes remain untouched, and we hold Brahman's
attributes to be real.--I read __abâdha.h__ in I. 2.].
100. If Brahman is understood to be destitute of qualities, then "truth,"

etc., will not be applicable to Him; but, if so, there arises a
contradiction in such passages [of Šruti] as "he is the truthful," etc.
[Footnote: I do not know where this passage occurs, but the kindred
word __satyadharman__ is applied to several deities in the Rigveda.]
101. When the existence of such a thing as a quality is admitted, we can
imagine it in something else [Footnote: The Vedântins hold that
nothing exists besides Brahman; and yet, although they thus deny the
existence of any other thing or quality, they hold that certain qualities
are imagined to exist in him, forgetting that only one who has seen
silver can imagine __rajatatva__ in nacre.]; but to imagine that nacre is
silver, we must first know clearly what silver is.
102. This universe is based on the soul as its site, being imagined in it
by ignorance; some teachers would describe it as an illusory emanation
[Footnote: It is a favourite doctrine of the Vedânta that ignorance, as
being imagined by ignorance, is itself false.]; but this is not a pleasing
doctrine to me.
103. It cannot be said that all this universe is false; since it is really the
plaything of Hari, who is eternally engaged in sport [Footnote: Manu, i.
80, "There are numberless Manvantaras, creations and destructions
numberless; the being supremely exalted performs all this, as in sport,
again and again."]
104. The external world is not like a dream; for in dreams there is sleep
and a host of imperfections; what we eat or drink in dreams gives us no
enjoyment, but these things are enjoyable in our waking state.
105. If all that is seen were false, then how could it produce effects?
The carrying of water in a jar is not false; all we can say is that it is
transient.
106. The idea that all this world is false, is opposed to experience; for
of what use would be all the expiations for sin, prescribed in the
law-books? Why are these thieves to be punished even by the king?
The upholder of the doctrine of Mâyâ can assert anything on his oath,
but all is false.
107. Thou canst not say that the visible world is only like the transitory
enjoyment of one who smells a wreath of flowers; however closely it is
scanned, there is no overpowering evidence of its unreality [to preclude
the presumption founded on experience];