The Tattva-Muktavali | Page 5

penixrón__}. Cf. Shilleto, Cambridge Journ. of Philology,
1876, p. 161.], and alter; hence one may learn that vast is the interval
between the two.
42. If the body is called the site of enjoyment, it is well known that this
definition will hold good (even in this highest case [Footnote: Could
__loke__ mean that it will hold good "of the world" as his
body?]),--there is nothing deficient but everything is present in the
Lord's body [Footnote: Cf. "Whose body nature is and God the soul."],
since He is the husband of Lakshmî.
43. "Every body is influenced by deserts,"--if this universal law is
accepted, then He who is the Maker of all must be impelled [to create
the world] by the deserts which dominate over beings like us [Footnote:
__I.e.__ he creates the world to give their deserts to the different souls.]
44. "Every body must be non-eternal,"--this is a general law, yet still
Κvara's body may be eternal; for earth is everywhere seen to be
non-eternal, while in the form of its atoms it is eternal.
45. One must not say, "why should the desert of one attach itself to
another?" For it was in consequence of the respective merits and
demerits of the elephant and the crocodile that the holder of the discus
made all haste to interfere in the battle [Footnote: The objector urges
"why should our good or evil deserts oblige God to act in a certain
way?" He answers by referring to the well-known legend given in the
Bhâgavata Purâ.na, viii. ch. 2-4. A certain king, named Indradyumna,
became an elephant through Agastya's curse. One day, while drinking
in a lake, he was seized by a crocodile, and the struggle lasted for a
thousand years. At last, in despair, he prayed to Vish.nu, who came
down mounted on Garu.da and killed the crocodile. Thus we see that,
although in one sense the deserts of one being cannot attach themselves
to another, still they must cause certain actions in another being, or it
would be impossible that each should receive its due reward or
punishment.]
46. It has been heard of old that all this universe proceeded from the
lotus of the navel of the Lord; hence is it established that be has a body,
for how can there be a navel without a body?
47. The body of God is very pure,--to be enjoyed by all the senses, as

being richly endowed with the six qualities [Footnote: These six
qualities, according to the Commentator on the Bhâgavata P. i. 3. 36,
are sovereignty, knowledge, glory, prosperity, dispassion, and virtue; a
different list is given in the Sarva Darš. S. p. 54, l. 22 (but cf. p. 69, l.
18). See also __infra__ in šl. 95.],--and to be discovered by means of
all the Vedas,--Gangâ verily is the water wherewith he washes his feet.
48. Whenever by the influence of time there comes the increase of evil
and the diminution of right, then the adorable Lord accomplishes the
preservation of the good and the destruction of the wicked.
49. The Lord is said to be twofold, as the Incarnation and He who
becomes incarnate; so too the souls are twofold, as divided into faithful
and faithless.
50. Now some say that the personal soul is only the reflection of the
Supreme; but their opinion does not at all hold, since it cannot be
established.
51. For how could there arise a reflection of that Infinite and stainless
one? and how could an insentient [reflection] enjoy the pain and
pleasure arising from the merit and demerit declared in the Veda?
52. There may indeed be a reflection of that which is limited; but how
shall there be one of Him whose attribute is infinity?
53. Râmânuja, the foremost of the learned, condemned this theory of an
original and its reflection; the fact that this doctrine is not accepted by
the learned, will not make it seem more plausible.
54. There is an eternal division between the two, from the words of the
Veda, "two birds;" [Footnote: Rig V. i. 164, 20, "Two birds associated
together, two friends, take refuge in the same tree; one of them eats the
sweet fig; the other, abstaining from food, merely looks on."] from the
mention there of "two friends," how can there be identity between
them?
55. I become Brahman, that is, I cease to have mundane existence
through beholding the soul in Brahman; the result of this would be the
abolition of sorrow, etc., but in no way absolute Oneness.
56. I become Brahman also through beholding Brahman in the soul
[Footnote: Another reading is __brahma.ny âtmanirîksha.nât__]; the
result would be the abolition of His being out of sight [Footnote:
__I.e.__ it would be always __videre videntem__], but in no way