The Story of the Pony Express | Page 4

out the benefits that would accrue to
California should it ever be put into execution. The Senator at once saw
the merits of the plan and quickly caught the contagion. Not only was
he enough of a statesman to appreciate the worth of a fast mail line
across the continent, but he was also a good enough politician to realize
that his position with his constituents and the country at large might be
greatly strengthened were he to champion the enactment of a popular
measure that would encourage the building of such a line through the
aid of a Federal subsidy.
So in January, 1855, Gwin introduced in the Senate a bill which
proposed to establish a weekly letter express service between St. Louis
and San Francisco. The express was to operate on a ten-day schedule,
follow the Central Route, and was to receive a compensation not
exceeding $500.00 for each round trip. This bill was referred to the
Committee on Military Affairs where it was quietly tabled and "killed."
For the next five years the attention of Congress was largely taken up
with the anti-slavery troubles that led to secession and war. Although
the people of the West, and the Pacific Coast in particular, continued to

agitate the need of a new and quick through mail service, for a long
time little was done. It has been claimed that southern representatives
in Congress during the decade before the war managed to prevent any
legislation favorable to overland mail routes running North of the
slave-holding states; and that they concentrated their strength to render
government aid to the southern routes whenever possible.
At that time there were three generally recognized lines of mail traffic,
of which the Panama line was by far the most important. Next came the
so-called southern or "Butterfield" route which started from St. Louis
and ran far to the southward, entering California from the extreme
southeast corner of the state; a goodly amount of mail being sent in this
direction. The Central route followed the Platte River into Wyoming
and reached Sacramento via Salt Lake City, almost from a due easterly
direction. On account of its location this route or trail could be easily
controlled by the North in case of war. It had received very meagre
support from the Government, and carried as a rule, only local mail.
While the most direct route to San Francisco, it had been rendered the
least important. This was not due solely to Congressional manipulation.
Because of its northern latitude and the numerous high mountain ranges
it traversed, this course was often blockaded with deep snows and was
generally regarded as extremely difficult of access during the winter
months.
While a majority of the people of California were loyal to the Union,
there was a vigorous minority intensely in sympathy with the southern
cause and ready to conspire for, or bring about by force of arms if
necessary, the secession of their state. As the Civil War became more
and more imminent, it became obvious to Union men in both East and
West that the existing lines of communication were untrustworthy. Just
as soon as trouble should start, the Confederacy could, and most
certainly would, gain control of the southern mail routes. Once in
control, she could isolate the Pacific coast for many months and thus
enable her sympathizers there the more effectually to perfect their plans
of secession. Or she might take advantage of these lines of travel, and,
by striking swiftly and suddenly, organize and reinforce her followers
in California, intimidate the Unionists, many of whom were apathetic,
and by a single bold stroke snatch the prize away from her antagonist
before the latter should have had time to act.

To avert this crisis some daring and original plan of communication
had to be organized to keep the East and West in close contact with
each other; and the Pony Express was the fulfillment of such a plan, for
it made a close cooperation between the California loyalists and the
Federal Government possible until after the crisis did pass. Yet, strange
as it may seem, this providential enterprise was not brought into
existence nor even materially aided by the Government. It was
organized and operated by a private corporation after having been
encouraged in its inception by a United States Senator who later turned
traitor to his country.
It finally happened that in the winter of 1859-60, Mr. William Russell,
senior partner of the firm of Russell, Majors, and Waddell, was called
to Washington in connection with some Government freight contracts.
While there he chanced to become acquainted with Senator Gwin who,
having been aroused, as we have seen, several years before, by one of
the firm's subordinates, at once brought before Mr. Russell the need of
better mail