The Story of the Barbary Corsairs | Page 4

or by the periodical presentation of costly gifts. The penalty of
resistance was too well known to need exemplification; thousands of
Christian slaves in the bagnios at Algiers bore witness to the
consequences of an independent policy. So long as the nations of
Europe continued to quarrel among themselves, instead of presenting a

united line of battle to the enemy, such humiliations had to be endured;
so long as a Corsair raid upon Spain suited the policy of France; so
long as the Dutch, in their jealousy of other states, could declare that
Algiers was necessary to them; there was no chance of the plague
subsiding; and it was not till the close of the great Napoleonic wars that
the Powers agreed, at the Congress of Aix-la-Chapelle in 1818, to act
together, and do away with the scourge of Christendom. And even then
little was accomplished till France combined territorial aggrandizement
with the rôle of a civilizing influence.
[Illustration: GALLEON OF THE FIFTEENTH CENTURY.
(Jurien de la Gravière.)]
There had been pirates in the Mediterranean long before the Turks took
up the trade; indeed, ever since boats were built their capabilities for
plunder must have been realized. The filibustering expedition of Jason
and the loot of the Golden Fleece is an early instance, and the Greeks at
all times have distinguished themselves by acting up to Jason's example
by sea and land. The Moslems, however, were some time in
accustoming themselves to the perils of the deep. At first they
marvelled greatly at "those that go down to the sea in ships, and have
their business in great waters," but they did not hasten to follow them.
In the early days of the conquest of Egypt the Khalif 'Omar wrote to his
general and asked him what the sea was like, to which 'Amr made
answer: "The Sea is a huge beast which silly folk ride like worms on
logs;" whereupon, much distressed, the prudent Khalif gave orders that
no Moslem should voyage on so unruly an element without his leave.
But it soon became clear that if the Moslems were to hold their own
with their neighbours (still more if they meant to hold their neighbours'
own) they must learn how to navigate; and accordingly, in the first
century of the Hijra, we find the Khalif 'Abd-el-Melik instructing his
lieutenant in Africa to use Tunis as an arsenal and dockyard, and there
to collect a fleet. From that time forward the Mohammedan rulers of
the Barbary coast were never long without ships of some sort. The
Aghlab[=i] princes sailed forth from Tunis, and took Sicily, Sardinia,
and Corsica. The F[=a]tim[=i] Khalifs waged war with the navies of

'Abd-er-Rahm[=a]n, the Great Khalif of Cordova, at a strength of two
hundred vessels a side. The Almohades possessed a large and capacious
fleet, in which they transported their armies to Spain, and their
successors in North Africa, though less powerful, were generally able
to keep up a number of vessels for offensive as well as commercial
purposes.
During the later Middle Ages the relations between the rulers of the
Barbary coast--the kings of Tunis, Tilims[=a]n, Fez, &c.--and the
trading nations of Christendom were amicable and just. Treaties show
that both parties agreed in denouncing and (so far as they could)
suppressing piracy and encouraging mutual commerce. It was not till
the beginning of the sixteenth century that a change came over these
peaceful conditions, and the way it happened was this.
When the united wisdom of Ferdinand and Isabella resolved on the
expatriation of the Spanish Moors, they forgot the risk of an exile's
vengeance.[1] No sooner was Granada fallen than thousands of
desperate Moors left the land which for seven hundred years had been
their home, and, disdaining to live under a Spanish yoke, crossed the
strait to Africa, where they established themselves at various strong
points, such as Shersh[=e]l, Oran, and notably at Algiers, which till
then had hardly been heard of. No sooner were the banished Moors
fairly settled in their new seats than they did what anybody in their
place would have done: they carried the war into their oppressors'
country. To meet the Spaniards in the open field was impossible in
their reduced numbers, but at sea their fleetness and knowledge of the
coasts gave them the opportunity of reprisal for which they longed.
Science, tradition, and observation inform us that primitive man had
certain affinities to the beast of prey. By superior strength or ingenuity
he slew or snared the means of subsistence. Civilized man leaves the
coarsest forms of slaughter to a professional class, and, if he kills at all,
elevates his pastime to the rank of sport by the refining element of skill
and the excitement of uncertainty and personal risk. But civilized man
is still