The Story of the 9th Kings in France | Page 5

although in the battle it is believed that the 2nd
Infantry Brigade lost a bigger proportion of men than had ever been
previously known in warfare.
On the 8th May, the Battalion took up its battle position in rear of the
Rue du Bois at Richebourg l'Avoué, and there awaited the attack on the
morrow. The detail that obtained in battle orders of later dates was
wanting, in view of the fact that greater responsibility was in the early
days placed upon Commanding Officers. The Battalion was to support
the attack as the third wave. The flanks were given and in the event of
an advance the Battalion was to keep Chocolat Menier Corner on its
immediate right. The fight commenced with an ordinary bombardment
of forty minutes chiefly by field pieces, which according to the text
book are primarily intended not for bombardment but for use against
personnel. A battery of heavy howitzers was also in action. The
ordinary bombardment was followed by an intense bombardment of ten
minutes.
At 5-30 a.m. the Battalion advanced to the third line of trenches
immediately in rear of the Rue du Bois, and several losses attributable
to machine guns and shells were sustained. At 6-0 a.m. the Battalion
was continuing the advance to the support line when the 2nd King's
Royal Rifles asked for immediate support in the attack. The Battalion
therefore passed over the support line and quickly reached the front line.
The advent of a fresh unit made confusion the worse confounded. The
trenches which afforded little shelter were filled with men, and the
enemy was using his artillery freely. Machine guns in profusion were
disgorging their several streams of bullets. Communication trenches
had been blotted out. Despite the lessons of Neuve Chapelle there was
no effective liaison between artillery and infantry as the telephone
wires were soon cut, and as a consequence the inferno was intensified

by the short firing of the British artillery, a battery of 6-inch howitzers
being the chief offender.
Numerous casualties had been suffered, and among them was the
Commanding Officer, who was killed. The command then passed to
Major J.W.B. Hunt, who decided that it was useless to attempt to
assault the enemy position without further artillery preparation, as the
enemy's barbed wire was practically intact, and the only two gaps that
were available were covered by enemy machine guns. A report on the
situation was made to Brigadier-General Thesiger, and instructions
were received that on no account was the Battalion to leave the front
line, and it was to hold the same against a possible and probable
counter attack by the enemy.
At 10-0 a.m. the Battalion was ordered to prepare to take part in a
second attack to be launched at 11-15 a.m. Half an hour later a further
order postponed the second attack until 12-30 p.m. Thousands had
failed to take the objectives in the early morning, and it was unlikely
that hundreds would succeed in the afternoon. This attack was
ultimately cancelled, and at 4-0 p.m. the Battalion was withdrawn. A
further attack was delivered in vain at 4-30 p.m. by other regiments in
the Division. Though the Battalion unfortunately accomplished little, it
sustained almost a hundred casualties, but it was fortunate in that it
escaped the same fate as befell four of the Battalions in the Brigade
which were almost annihilated. The battle from almost every point of
view was a dismal failure, and the rate of casualties was perhaps the
highest then recorded. It was during the 4-30 p.m. attack that the men
were privileged to witness one of the most magnificent episodes of the
war, which was the advance made by the 1st Battalion Black Watch
and the 1st Battalion Cameron Highlanders. This was carried out with
parade-like precision in face of a most withering rifle and machine-gun
fire, out of which scarcely half a dozen of those brave fellows returned.
Relieved in the evening, the "Ninth" marched to Essars and the next
day to billets at Bethune, and it was not until the 20th day of the month
that the Battalion was again in line, this time at Cambrin. It had now
come under the command of Major F.W. Ramsay, a regular officer

from the Middlesex Regiment. The remainder of the month of May and
the month of June were spent at Cambrin and Cuinchy, this latter place
being renowned even in those days for its minenwerfer activity. The
Cambrin sector had good deep trenches made by the French pioneers,
which were strong, well timbered and comfortable. This was the first
occasion the Battalion occupied trenches as distinguished from
breast-works. Hitherto the nature of the ground had made trenches
impossible. The trenches at Cuinchy were in front of a row of
brickstacks, and in consequence of the water-logged