The River War | Page 6

Winston S. Churchill

state at the confluence of the Niles. The representatives of foreign

Powers established themselves in the city. The trade of the south
converged upon Khartoum. Thither the subordinate governors, Beys
and Mudirs, repaired at intervals to report the state of their provinces
and to receive instructions. Thither were sent the ivory of Equatoria, the
ostrich feathers of Kordofan, gum from Darfur, grain from Sennar, and
taxes collected from all the regions. Strange beasts, entrapped in the
swamps and forests, passed through the capital on their journey to
Cairo and Europe. Complex and imposing reports of revenue and
expenditure were annually compiled. An elaborate and dignified
correspondence was maintained between Egypt and its great
dependency. The casual observer, astonished at the unusual capacity for
government displayed by an Oriental people, was tempted to accept the
famous assertion which Nubar Pasha put into the mouth of the Khedive
Ismail: 'We are no longer in Africa, but in Europe.' Yet all was a hateful
sham ['The government of the Egyptians in these far-off countries is
nothing else but one of brigandage of the very worst
description.'--COLONEL GORDON IN CENTRAL AFRICA, April 11,
1879.] The arbitrary and excessive taxes were collected only at the
point of the bayonet. If a petty chief fell into arrears, his neighbours
were raised against him. If an Arab tribe were recalcitrant, a military
expedition was despatched. Moreover, the ability of the Arabs to pay
depended on their success as slave-hunters. When there had been a
good catch, the revenue profited. The Egyptian Government had joined
the International League against the slave trade. They combined,
however, indirectly but deliberately, to make money out of it. [EGYPT,
No.11, 1883.]
In the miserable, harassing warfare that accompanied the collection of
taxes the Viceregal commanders gained more from fraud than force. No
subterfuge, no treachery, was too mean for them to adopt: no oath or
treaty was too sacred for them to break. Their methods were cruel, and
if honour did not impede the achievement, mercy did not restrict the
effects of their inglorious successes; and the effete administrators
delighted to order their timid soldiery to carry out the most savage
executions. The political methods and social style of the
Governors-General were imitated more or less exactly by the
subordinate officials according to their degree in the provinces. Since
they were completely hidden from the eye of civilisation, they enjoyed

a greater licence in their administration. As their education was inferior,
so their habits became more gross. Meanwhile the volcano on which
they disported themselves was ominously silent. The Arab tribes
obeyed, and the black population cowered.
The authority of a tyrannical Government was supported by the
presence of a worthless army. Nearly forty thousand men were
distributed among eight main and numerous minor garrisons. Isolated
in a roadless country by enormous distances and natural obstacles, and
living in the midst of large savage populations of fanatical character
and warlike habits, whose exasperation was yearly growing with their
miseries, the Viceregal forces might depend for their safety only on the
skill of their officers, the excellence of their discipline, and the
superiority of their weapons. But the Egyptian officers were at that time
distinguished for nothing but their public incapacity and private
misbehaviour. The evil reputation of the Soudan and its climate
deterred the more educated or more wealthy from serving in such
distant regions, and none went south who could avoid it. The army
which the Khedives maintained in the Delta was, judged by European
standards, only a rabble. It was badly trained, rarely paid, and very
cowardly; and the scum of the army of the Delta was the cream of the
army of the Soudan. The officers remained for long periods, many all
their lives, in the obscurity of the remote provinces. Some had been
sent there in disgrace, others in disfavour. Some had been forced to
serve out of Egypt by extreme poverty, others were drawn to the
Soudan by the hopes of gratifying peculiar tastes. The majority had
harems of the women of the country, which were limited only by the
amount of money they could lay their hands on by any method. Many
were hopeless and habitual drunkards. Nearly all were dishonest. All
were indolent and incapable.
Under such leadership the finest soldiery would have soon degenerated.
The Egyptians in the Soudan were not fine soldiers. Like their officers,
they were the worst part of the Khedivial army. Like them, they had
been driven to the south. Like them, they were slothful and effete. Their
training was imperfect; their discipline was lax; their courage was low.
Nor was even this all the weakness and peril of their position; for while
the regular troops were thus demoralised, there existed a powerful local
irregular force of Bazingers (Soudanese riflemen), as well
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