The Rise of the Dutch Republic, 1574-84 | Page 7

or simply the Blood-Council. It was, however, necessary for
the states' commissioners to consider their reply very carefully; for the
royal plenipotentiaries had placed themselves upon specious grounds. It
was not enough to feel that the King's government was paltering with
them; it was likewise necessary for the states' agents to impress this fact
upon the people.
There was a pause in the deliberations. Meantime, Count Schwartzburg,

reluctantly accepting the conviction that the religious question was an
insurmountable obstacle to a peace, left the provinces for Germany.
The last propositions of the government plenipotentiaries had been
discussed in the councils of the various cities, so that the reply of the
Prince, and estates was delayed until the 1st of June. They admitted, in
this communication, that the offer to restore ancient privileges had an
agreeable sound; but regretted that if the whole population were to be
banished, there would be but few to derive advantage from the
restoration. If the King would put an end to religious persecution, he
would find as much loyalty in the provinces as his forefathers had
found. It was out of the question, they said, for the states to disarm and
to deliver up their strong places, before the Spanish soldiery had retired,
and before peace had been established. It was their wish to leave the
question of religion, together with all other disputed matters, to the
decision of the assembly. Were it possible, in the meantime, to devise
any effectual method for restraining hostilities, it would gladly be
embraced.
On the 8th of July, the royal commissioners inquired what guarantee
the states would be willing to give, that the decision of the general
assembly, whatever it might be, should be obeyed. The demand was
answered by another, in which the King's agents were questioned as to
their own guarantees. Hereupon it was stated that his Majesty would
give his word and sign manual, together with the word and signature of
the Emperor into the bargain. In exchange for these promises, the
Prince and estates were expected to give their own oaths and seals,
together with a number of hostages. Over and above this, they were
requested to deliver up the cities of Brill and Enkhuizen, Flushing and
Arnemuyde. The disparity of such guarantees was ridiculous. The royal
word, even when strengthened by the imperial promise, and confirmed
by the autographs of Philip and Maximilian, was not so solid a security,
in the opinion of Netherlanders, as to outweigh four cities in Holland
and Zealand, with all their population and wealth. To give collateral
pledges and hostages upon one side, while the King offered none, was
to assign a superiority to the royal word, over that of the Prince and the
estates which there was no disposition to recognize. Moreover, it was
very cogently urged that to give up the cities was to give as security for
the contract, some of the principal contracting parties.

This closed the negotiations. The provincial plenipotentiaries took their
leave by a paper dated 13th July, 1575, which recapitulated the main
incidents of the conference. They expressed their deep regret that his
Majesty should insist so firmly on the banishment of the Reformers, for
it was unjust to reserve the provinces to the sole use of a small number
of Catholics. They lamented that the proposition which had been made,
to refer the religious question to the estates, had neither been loyally
accepted, nor candidly refused. They inferred, therefore, that the object
of the royal government had, been to amuse the states, while tine was
thus gained for reducing the country into a slavery more abject than any
which had yet existed. On the other hand, the royal commissioners as
solemnly averred that the whole responsibility for the failure of the
negotiations belonged to the, estates.
It was the general opinion in the insurgent provinces that the
government had been insincere from the beginning, and had neither
expected nor desired to conclude a peace. It is probable, however, that
Philip was sincere; so far as it could be called sincerity to be willing to
conclude a peace, if the provinces would abandon the main objects of
the war. With his impoverished exchequer, and ruin threatening his
whole empire, if this mortal combat should be continued many years
longer, he could have no motive for further bloodshed, provided all
heretics should consent to abandon the country. As usual, however, he
left his agents in the dark as to his real intentions. Even Requesens was
as much in doubt as to the King's secret purposes as Margaret of Parma
had ever been in former times.
[Compare the remarks of Groen v. Prinst., Archives, etc., v 259- 262;
Bor, viii. 606, 615; Meteren, v. 100; Hoofd, g. 410.--Count John of
Nassau was distrustful and disdainful