The Revolt of The Netherlands, book 4 | Page 8

Friedrich von Schiller
to alter the plan hitherto adopted, which now
appeared defective in several respects. Inasmuch as all classes had been
oppressed without distinction, and as much of severity shown to the
lower orders as of contempt to the nobles, both had been compelled to

lend support to one another; a party had been given to the latter and
leaders to the former. Unequal treatment seemed an infallible expedient
to separate them; the mob, always timid and indolent when not goaded
by the extremity of distress, would very soon desert its adored
protectors and quickly learn to see in their fate well-merited retribution
if only it was not driven to share it with them. It was therefore proposed
to the king to treat the great multitude for the future with more leniency,
and to direct all measures of severity against the leaders of the faction.
In order, however, to avoid the appearance of a disgraceful concession,
it was considered advisable to accept the mediation of the Emperor, and
to impute to it alone and not to the justice of their demands, that the
king out of pure generosity had granted to his Belgian subjects as much
as they asked.
The question of the king's personal visit to the provinces was now again
mooted, and all the difficulties which had formerly been raised on this
head appeared to vanish before the present emergency. "Now," said
Tyssenacque and Hopper, "the juncture has really arrived at which the
king, according to his own declaration formerly made to Count Egmont,
will be ready to risk a thousand lives. To restore quiet to Ghent Charles
V. had undertaken a troublesome and dangerous journey through an
enemy's country. This was done for the sake of a single town; and now
the peace, perhaps even the possession, of all the United Provinces was
at stake." This was the opinion of the majority; and the journey of the
king was looked upon as a matter from which he could not possibly any
longer escape.
The question now was, whether he should enter upon it with a
numerous body of attendants or with few; and here the Prince of Eboli
and Count Figueroa were at issue with the Duke of Alva, as their
private interests clashed. If the king journeyed at the head of an army
the presence of the Duke of Alva would be indispensable, who, on the
other hand, if matters were peaceably adjusted, would be less required,
and must make room for his rivals. "An army," said Figueroa, who
spoke first, "would alarm the princes through whose territories it must
march, and perhaps even be opposed by them; it would, moreover,
unnecessarily burden the provinces for whose tranquillization it was
intended, and add a new grievance to the many which had already
driven the people to such lengths. It would press indiscriminately upon

all of the king's subjects, whereas a court of justice, peaceably
administering its office, would observe a marked distinction between
the innocent and the guilty. The unwonted violence of the former
course would tempt the leaders of the faction to take a more alarming
view of their behavior, in which wantonness and levity had the chief
share, and consequently induce them to proceed with deliberation and
union; the thought of having forced the king to such lengths would
plunge them into despair, in which they would be ready to undertake
anything. If the king placed himself in arms against the rebels he would
forfeit the most important advantage which he possessed over them,
namely, his authority as sovereign of the country, which would prove
the more powerful in proportion as he showed his reliance upon that
alone. He would place himself thereby, as it were, on a level with the
rebels, who on their side would not be at a loss to raise an army, as the
universal hatred of the Spanish forces would operate in their favor with
the nation. By this procedure the king would exchange the certain
advantage which his position as sovereign of the country conferred
upon him for the uncertain result of military operations, which, result
as they might, would of necessity destroy a portion of his own subjects.
The rumor of his hostile approach would outrun him time enough to
allow all who were conscious of a bad cause to place themselves in a
posture of defence, and to combine and render availing both their
foreign and domestic resources. Here again the general alarm would do
them important service; the uncertainty who would be the first object of
this warlike approach would drive even the less guilty to the general
mass of the rebels, and force those to become enemies to the king who
otherwise would never have been so. If, however, he was coming
among them without such a formidable
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