especially with subalterns, and Count Brederode
even drew his sword upon an ensign who wished time for consideration.
Men of all classes and conditions signed it. Religion made no
difference. Roman Catholic priests even were associates of the league.
The motives were not the same with all, but the pretext was similar.
The Roman Catholics desired simply the abolition of the Inquisition,
and a mitigation of the edicts; the Protestants aimed at unlimited
freedom of conscience. A few daring spirits only entertained so bold a
project as the overthrow of the present government, while the needy
and indigent based the vilest hopes on a general anarchy. A farewell
entertainment, which about this time was given to the Counts
Schwarzenberg and Holle in Breda, and another shortly afterwards in
Hogstraten, drew many of the principal nobility to these two places,
and of these several had already signed the covenant. The Prince of
Orange, Counts Egmont, Horn, and Megen were present at the latter
banquet, but without any concert or design, and without having
themselves any share in the league, although one of Egmont's own
secretaries and some of the servants of the other three noblemen had
openly joined it. At this entertainment three hundred persons gave in
their adhesion to the covenant, and the question was mooted whether
the whole body should present themselves before the regent armed or
unarmed, with a declaration or with a petition? Horn and Orange
(Egmont would not countenance the business in any way) were called
in as arbiters upon this point, and they decided in favor of the more
moderate and submissive procedure. By taking this office upon them
they exposed themselves to the charge of having in no very covert
manner lent their sanction to the enterprise of the confederates. In
compliance, therefore, with their advice, it was determined to present
their address unarmed, and in the form of a petition, and a day was
appointed on which they should assemble in Brussels.
The first intimation the regent received of this conspiracy of the nobles
was given by the Count of Megen soon after his return to the capital.
"There was," he said, "an enterprise on foot; no less than three hundred
of the nobles were implicated in it; it referred to religion; the members
of it had bound themselves together by an oath; they reckoned much on
foreign aid; she would soon know more about it." Though urgently
pressed, he would give her no further information. "A nobleman," he
said, "had confided it to him under the seal of secrecy, and he had
pledged his word of honor to him." What really withheld him from
giving her any further explanation was, in all probability, not so much
any delicacy about his honor, as his hatred of the Inquisition, which he
would not willingly do anything to advance. Soon after him, Count
Egmont delivered to the regent a copy of the covenant, and also gave
her the names of the conspirators, with some few exceptions. Nearly
about the same time the Prince of Orange wrote to her: "There was, as
he had heard, an army enlisted, four hundred officers were already
named, and twenty thousand men would presently appear in arms."
Thus the rumor was intentionally exaggerated, and the danger was
multiplied in every mouth.
The regent, petrified with alarm at the first announcement of these
tidings, and guided solely by her fears, hastily called together all the
members of the council of state who happened to be then in Brussels,
and at the same time sent a pressing summons to the Prince of Orange
and Count Horn, inviting them to resume their seats in the senate.
Before the latter could arrive she consulted with Egmont, Megen, and
Barlaimont what course was to be adopted in the present dangerous
posture of affairs. The question debated was whether it would be better
to have recourse to arms or to yield to the emergency and grant the
demands of the confederates; or whether they should be put off with
promises, and an appearance of compliance, in order to gain time for
procuring instructions from Spain, and obtaining money and troops?
For the first plan the requisite supplies were wanting, and, what was
equally requisite, confidence in the army, of which there seemed reason
to doubt whether it had not been already gained by the conspirators.
The second expedient would it was quite clear never be sanctioned by
the king; besides it would serve rather to raise than depress the courage
of the confederates; while, on the other hand, a compliance with their
reasonable demands and a ready unconditional pardon of the past
would in all probability stifle the rebellion in the cradle. The last
opinion was supported by Megen and Egmont but opposed by
Barlaimont. "Rumor," said the
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