The Proficience and Advancement of Learning | Page 6

involveth them both." And for the
second, certain it is there is no vexation or anxiety of mind which
resulteth from knowledge otherwise than merely by accident; for all
knowledge and wonder (which is the seed of knowledge) is an
impression of pleasure in itself; but when men fall to framing
conclusions out of their knowledge, applying it to their particular, and
ministering to themselves thereby weak fears or vast desires, there
groweth that carefulness and trouble of mind which is spoken of; for
then knowledge is no more Lumen siccum, whereof Heraclitus the
profound said, Lumen siccum optima anima; but it becometh Lumen

madidum, or maceratum, being steeped and infused in the humours of
the affections. And as for the third point, it deserveth to be a little stood
upon, and not to be lightly passed over; for if any man shall think by
view and inquiry into these sensible and material things to attain that
light, whereby he may reveal unto himself the nature or will of God,
then, indeed, is he spoiled by vain philosophy; for the contemplation of
God's creatures and works produceth (having regard to the works and
creatures themselves) knowledge, but having regard to God no perfect
knowledge, but wonder, which is broken knowledge. And, therefore, it
was most aptly said by one of Plato's school, "That the sense of man
carrieth a resemblance with the sun, which (as we see) openeth and
revealeth all the terrestrial globe; but then, again, it obscureth and
concealeth the stars and celestial globe: so doth the sense discover
natural things, but it darkeneth and shutteth up divine." And hence it is
true that it hath proceeded, that divers great learned men have been
heretical, whilst they have sought to fly up to the secrets of the Deity
by this waxen wings of the senses. And as for the conceit that too much
knowledge should incline a man to atheism, and that the ignorance of
second causes should make a more devout dependence upon God,
which is the first cause; first, it is good to ask the question which Job
asked of his friends: "Will you lie for God, as one man will lie for
another, to gratify him?" For certain it is that God worketh nothing in
Nature but by second causes; and if they would have it otherwise
believed, it is mere imposture, as it were in favour towards God, and
nothing else but to offer to the Author of truth the unclean sacrifice of a
lie. But further, it is an assured truth, and a conclusion of experience,
that a little or superficial knowledge of philosophy may incline the
mind of men to atheism, but a further proceeding therein doth bring the
mind back again to religion. For in the entrance of philosophy, when
the second causes, which are next unto the senses, do offer themselves
to the mind of man, if it dwell and stay there it may induce some
oblivion of the highest cause; but when a man passeth on further and
seeth the dependence of causes and the works of Providence; then,
according to the allegory of the poets, he will easily believe that the
highest link of Nature's chain must needs he tied to the foot of Jupiter's
chair. To conclude, therefore, let no man upon a weak conceit of
sobriety or an ill-applied moderation think or maintain that a man can

search too far, or be too well studied in the book of God's word, or in
the book of God's works, divinity or philosophy; but rather let men
endeavour an endless progress or proficience in both; only let men
beware that they apply both to charity, and not to swelling; to use, and
not to ostentation; and again, that they do not unwisely mingle or
confound these learnings together.
II. (1) And as for the disgraces which learning receiveth from politics,
they be of this nature: that learning doth soften men's minds, and makes
them more unapt for the honour and exercise of arms; that it doth mar
and pervert men's dispositions for matter of government and policy, in
making them too curious and irresolute by variety of reading, or too
peremptory or positive by strictness of rules and axioms, or too
immoderate and overweening by reason of the greatness of examples,
or too incompatible and differing from the times by reason of the
dissimilitude of examples; or at least, that it doth divert men's travails
from action and business, and bringeth them to a love of leisure and
privateness; and that it doth bring into states a relaxation of discipline,
whilst every man is more ready to argue than to obey and execute. Out
of this conceit Cato, surnamed the Censor, one of the wisest men
indeed that ever lived,