The Problems of Philosophy | Page 8

the contrary tends to simplify and systematize our account of our experiences, there
seems no good reason for rejecting it. We may therefore admit--though with a slight

doubt derived from dreams--that the external world does really exist, and is not wholly
dependent for its existence upon our continuing to perceive it.
The argument which has led us to this conclusion is doubtless less strong than we could
wish, but it is typical of many philosophical arguments, and it is therefore worth while to
consider briefly its general character and validity. All knowledge, we find, must be built
up upon our instinctive beliefs, and if these are rejected, nothing is left. But among our
instinctive beliefs some are much stronger than others, while many have, by habit and
association, become entangled with other beliefs, not really instinctive, but falsely
supposed to be part of what is believed instinctively.
Philosophy should show us the hierarchy of our instinctive beliefs, beginning with those
we hold most strongly, and presenting each as much isolated and as free from irrelevant
additions as possible. It should take care to show that, in the form in which they are
finally set forth, our instinctive beliefs do not clash, but form a harmonious system. There
can never be any reason for rejecting one instinctive belief except that it clashes with
others; thus, if they are found to harmonize, the whole system becomes worthy of
acceptance.
It is of course possible that all or any of our beliefs may be mistaken, and therefore all
ought to be held with at least some slight element of doubt. But we cannot have reason to
reject a belief except on the ground of some other belief. Hence, by organizing our
instinctive beliefs and their consequences, by considering which among them is most
possible, if necessary, to modify or abandon, we can arrive, on the basis of accepting as
our sole data what we instinctively believe, at an orderly systematic organization of our
knowledge, in which, though the possibility of error remains, its likelihood is diminished
by the interrelation of the parts and by the critical scrutiny which has preceded
acquiescence.
This function, at least, philosophy can perform. Most philosophers, rightly or wrongly,
believe that philosophy can do much more than this--that it can give us knowledge, not
otherwise attainable, concerning the universe as a whole, and concerning the nature of
ultimate reality. Whether this be the case or not, the more modest function we have
spoken of can certainly be performed by philosophy, and certainly suffices, for those who
have once begun to doubt the adequacy of common sense, to justify the arduous and
difficult labours that philosophical problems involve.

CHAPTER III
THE NATURE OF MATTER
In the preceding chapter we agreed, though without being able to find demonstrative
reasons, that it is rational to believe that our sense-data--for example, those which we
regard as associated with my table--are really signs of the existence of something
independent of us and our perceptions. That is to say, over and above the sensations of
colour, hardness, noise, and so on, which make up the appearance of the table to me, I
assume that there is something else, of which these things are appearances. The colour
ceases to exist if I shut my eyes, the sensation of hardness ceases to exist if I remove my
arm from contact with the table, the sound ceases to exist if I cease to rap the table with
my knuckles. But I do not believe that when all these things cease the table ceases. On
the contrary, I believe that it is because the table exists continuously that all these

sense-data will reappear when I open my eyes, replace my arm, and begin again to rap
with my knuckles. The question we have to consider in this chapter is: What is the nature
of this real table, which persists independently of my perception of it?
To this question physical science gives an answer, somewhat incomplete it is true, and in
part still very hypothetical, but yet deserving of respect so far as it goes. Physical science,
more or less unconsciously, has drifted into the view that all natural phenomena ought to
be reduced to motions. Light and heat and sound are all due to wave-motions, which
travel from the body emitting them to the person who sees light or feels heat or hears
sound. That which has the wave-motion is either aether or 'gross matter', but in either
case is what the philosopher would call matter. The only properties which science assigns
to it are position in space, and the power of motion according to the laws of motion.
Science does not deny that it may have other properties; but if so, such other properties
are not useful to the