The Problem of China | Page 3

the West; but in future our
economic superiority is likely to be quite as potent. I believe that, if the
Chinese are left free to assimilate what they want of our civilization,
and to reject what strikes them as bad, they will be able to achieve an
organic growth from their own tradition, and to produce a very splendid
result, combining our merits with theirs. There are, however, two
opposite dangers to be avoided if this is to happen. The first danger is
that they may become completely Westernized, retaining nothing of
what has hitherto distinguished them, adding merely one more to the
restless, intelligent, industrial, and militaristic nations which now afflict
this unfortunate planet. The second danger is that they may be driven,
in the course of resistance to foreign aggression, into an intense
anti-foreign conservatism as regards everything except armaments.
This has happened in Japan, and it may easily happen in China. The
future of Chinese culture is intimately bound up with political and
economic questions; and it is through their influence that dangers arise.
China is confronted with two very different groups of foreign Powers,
on the one hand the white nations, on the other hand Japan. In
considering the effect of the white races on the Far East as a whole,
modern Japan must count as a Western product; therefore the
responsibility for Japan's doings in China rests ultimately with her
white teachers. Nevertheless, Japan remains very unlike Europe and
America, and has ambitions different from theirs as regards China. We
must therefore distinguish three possibilities: (1) China may become
enslaved to one or more white nations; (2) China may become enslaved
to Japan; (3) China may recover and retain her liberty. Temporarily
there is a fourth possibility, namely that a consortium of Japan and the
White Powers may control China; but I do not believe that, in the long
run, the Japanese will be able to co-operate with England and America.
In the long run, I believe that Japan must dominate the Far East or go

under. If the Japanese had a different character this would not be the
case; but the nature of their ambitions makes them exclusive and
unneighbourly. I shall give the reasons for this view when I come to
deal with the relations of China and Japan.
To understand the problem of China, we must first know something of
Chinese history and culture before the irruption of the white man, then
something of modern Chinese culture and its inherent tendencies; next,
it is necessary to deal in outline with the military and diplomatic
relations of the Western Powers with China, beginning with our war of
1840 and ending with the treaty concluded after the Boxer rising of
1900. Although the Sino-Japanese war comes in this period, it is
possible to separate, more or less, the actions of Japan in that war, and
to see what system the White Powers would have established if Japan
had not existed. Since that time, however, Japan has been the dominant
foreign influence in Chinese affairs. It is therefore necessary to
understand how the Japanese became what they are: what sort of nation
they were before the West destroyed their isolation, and what influence
the West has had upon them. Lack of understanding of Japan has made
people in England blind to Japan's aims in China, and unable to
apprehend the meaning of what Japan has done.
Political considerations alone, however, will not suffice to explain what
is going on in relation to China; economic questions are almost more
important. China is as yet hardly industrialized, and is certainly the
most important undeveloped area left in the world. Whether the
resources of China are to be developed by China, by Japan, or by the
white races, is a question of enormous importance, affecting not only
the whole development of Chinese civilization, but the balance of
power in the world, the prospects of peace, the destiny of Russia, and
the chances of development towards a better economic system in the
advanced nations.
The Washington Conference has partly exhibited and partly concealed
the conflict for the possession of China between nations all of which
have guaranteed China's independence and integrity. Its outcome has
made it far more difficult than before to give a hopeful answer as

regards Far Eastern problems, and in particular as regards the question:
Can China preserve any shadow of independence without a great
development of nationalism and militarism? I cannot bring myself to
advocate nationalism and militarism, yet it is difficult to know what to
say to patriotic Chinese who ask how they can be avoided. So far, I
have found only one answer. The Chinese nation, is the most, patient in
the world; it thinks of centuries as other nations think of decades. It is