The Principles of Philosophy | Page 7

we
make use of false principles, we depart the farther from the knowledge
of truth and wisdom exactly in proportion to the care with which we
cultivate them, and apply ourselves to the deduction of diverse
consequences from them, thinking that we are philosophizing well,
while we are only departing the farther from the truth; from which it
must be inferred that they who have learned the least of all that has
been hitherto distinguished by the name of philosophy are the most
fitted for the apprehension of truth.
After making those matters clear, I should, in the next place, have
desired to set forth the grounds for holding that the true principles by
which we may reach that highest degree of wisdom wherein consists
the sovereign good of human life, are those I have proposed in this
work; and two considerations alone are sufficient to establish this--the
first of which is, that these principles are very clear, and the second,
that we can deduce all other truths from them; for it is only these two
conditions that are required in true principles. But I easily prove that
they are very clear; firstly, by a reference to the manner in which I
found them, namely, by rejecting all propositions that were in the least
doubtful, for it is certain that such as could not be rejected by this test
when they were attentively considered, are the most evident and clear
which the human mind can know. Thus by considering that he who
strives to doubt of all is unable nevertheless to doubt that he is while he
doubts, and that what reasons thus, in not being able to doubt of itself

and doubting nevertheless of everything else, is not that which we call
our body, but what we name our mind or thought, I have taken the
existence of this thought for the first principle, from which I very
clearly deduced the following truths, namely, that there is a God who is
the author of all that is in the world, and who, being the source of all
truth, cannot have created our understanding of such a nature as to be
deceived in the judgments it forms of the things of which it possesses a
very clear and distinct perception. Those are all the principles of which
I avail myself touching immaterial or metaphysical objects, from which
I most clearly deduce these other principles of physical or corporeal
things, namely, that there are bodies extended in length, breadth, and
depth, which are of diverse figures and are moved in a variety of ways.
Such are in sum the principles from which I deduce all other truths. The
second circumstance that proves the clearness of these principles is,
that they have been known in all ages, and even received as true and
indubitable by all men, with the exception only of the existence of God,
which has been doubted by some, because they attributed too much to
the perceptions of the senses, and God can neither be seen nor touched.
But, though all the truths which I class among my principles were
known at all times, and by all men, nevertheless, there has been no one
up to the present, who, so far as I know, has adopted them as principles
of philosophy: in other words, as such that we can deduce from them
the knowledge of whatever else is in the world. It accordingly now
remains for me to prove that they are such; and it appears to me that I
cannot better establish this than by the test of experience: in other
words, by inviting readers to peruse the following work. For, though I
have not treated in it of all matters- -that being impossible--I think I
have so explained all of which I had occasion to treat, that they who
read it attentively will have ground for the persuasion that it is
unnecessary to seek for any other principles than those I have given, in
order to arrive at the most exalted knowledge of which the mind of man
is capable; especially if, after the perusal of my writings, they take the
trouble to consider how many diverse questions are therein discussed
and explained, and, referring to the writings of others, they see how
little probability there is in the reasons that are adduced in explanation
of the same questions by principles different from mine. And that they

may the more easily undertake this, I might have said that those imbued
with my doctrines have much less difficulty in comprehending the
writings of others, and estimating their true value, than those who have
not been so imbued; and this is precisely the opposite of what I before
said of such as commenced with the ancient philosophy, namely, that
the more