The Philosophy of the Moral Feelings | Page 9

Truths,--principles which are now universally admitted to require no other evidence than the conviction which forces itself upon every sound understanding.

PHILOSOPHY
OF
THE MORAL FEELINGS.
When we analyze the principles which distinguish man as a moral being, our attention is first directed to his actions, as the external phenomena by which we judge of his internal principles. It is familiar to every one, however, that the same action may proceed from very different motives, and that, when we have the means of estimating motives or principles, it is from these that we form our judgment respecting the moral condition of the individual, and not from his actions alone. When we consider separately the elements which enter into the economy of an intelligent and responsible agent, they seem to resolve themselves into the following:--
I. His actual conduct, or actions.
II. In determining his conduct, the immediate principle is his will, or simple volition. He wills some act,--and the act follows of course, unless it be prevented by restraint from without, or by physical inability to perform it. These alone can interfere with a man following the determination of his will, or simple volition.
III. The objects of will or simple volition are referable to two classes,--objects to be obtained,--and actions to be performed to others;--and these are connected with two distinct mental conditions, which exist previously to the act of volition. In regard to objects to be obtained, this mental condition is Desire;--in regard to actions towards others, it is Affection. The Desires and Affections, therefore, hold a place in the mind previous to volition. From one of them originates the mental state which, under certain regulations, leads to volition, or to our willing a certain act. The act, which is then the result of the volition, consists either in certain efforts towards attaining the object desired,--or in certain conduct towards other men, amusing out of our affections or mental feelings towards them. The Desires and Affections, therefore, may be considered as the primary or moving powers, from which our actions proceed. In connection with them we have to keep in view another principle, which has an extensive influence on our conduct in regard to both these classes of emotions. This is Self-love;--which leads us to seek our own protection, comfort, and advantage. It is a sound and legitimate principle of action when kept in its proper place;--when allowed to usurp an undue influence, it degenerates into selfishness; and it then interferes in a material degree with the exercise of the affections, or, in other words, with our duty to other men.
IV. We have next to attend to the fact, that every desire is not followed by actual volition towards obtaining the object;--and that every affection does not lead to the conduct which might flow from it. Thus a man may feel a desire which, after consideration, he determines not to gratify. Another may experience an affection, and not act upon it;--he may feel benevolence or friendship, and yet act, in the particular case, with cold selfishness;--or he may feel the impulse of anger, and yet conduct himself with forbearance. When, therefore, we go another step backwards in the chain of moral sequences, our attention is directed to certain principles by which the determination is actually decided,--either according to the desire or affection which is present to the mind, or in opposition to it. This brings us to a subject of the utmost practical importance:--and the principles, which thus decide the determination of the mind, are referable to two heads.
(1.) The determination or decision may arise out of a certain state of arrangement of the moving powers themselves, in consequence of which some one of them has acquired a predominating influence in the moral system. This usually results from habit, or frequent indulgence, as we shall see in a subsequent part of our inquiry. A man, for example, may desire an object, but perceive that the attainment would require a degree of exertion greater than he is disposed to devote to it. This is the preponderating love of ease, a branch of self-love. Another may perceive that the gratification would impair his good name, or the estimation in which he is anxious to stand in the eyes of other men;--this is the predominating love of approbation, or regard to character. In the same manner, a third may feel that it would interfere with his schemes of avarice or ambition,--and so in regard to the other desires. On a similar principle, a man may experience a strong impulse of anger, but perceive that there would be danger in gratifying it, or that he would promote his reputation or his interest by not acting upon it;--he may experience a benevolent affection, but feel that the exercise would interfere too much with his personal interest or comfort.
(2.) The determination