The Panama Canal Conflict between Great Britain and the United States of America | Page 5

against vessels of her
opponent; could let her own men-of-war revictual or take in stores
within the Canal even if there were no strict necessity for doing so;
could embark and disembark troops, munitions of war, or warlike
materials in the Canal, although all these were destined to be made use
of during the war generally, and not only for the defence of the Canal
against a possible attack. There ought, however, to be no doubt that the
United States is as much bound to obey the rules of Article III of the
Hay-Pauncefote Treaty as Great Britain or any other foreign State.
These rules are intended to invest the Canal with the character of
neutrality. If the United States were not bound to obey them, the Canal
would lose its neutral character, and, in case she were a belligerent, her
opponent would be justified in considering the Canal a part of the
region of war and could, therefore, make it the theatre of war. The mere
fact that Article III of the Hay-Pauncefote Treaty refers to the rules in
existence concerning the neutralisation of the Suez Canal, and that
Article IV of the Suez Canal Treaty of 1888 expressly stipulates the
neutralisation of the Canal even should Turkey be a belligerent, ought
to be sufficient to prove that the neutralisation of the Panama Canal is
stipulated by the Hay-Pauncefote Treaty even should the United States
be a belligerent.

Furthermore, one must come to the same conclusion if one takes into
consideration the objects, which are three in number, of the
neutralisation of an inter-oceanic canal.
The first object is that a canal shall be open in time of war as well as in
time of peace, so that navigation through the canal may be unhampered
by the fact that war is being waged. If the canal were not neutralised,
the territorial sovereign would be compelled, if he were neutral in a war,
to prevent the passing through the canal of men-of-war of either
belligerent, because such passage would be equivalent to the passage of
belligerent troops through neutral land territory.
The second object is that the territorial sovereign shall be prevented
from closing a canal or interfering with the free use of it by vessels of
all nations in case he himself is a party to a war. If the canal were not
neutralised, the belligerent territorial sovereign could, during the war,
close the canal or interfere with its free use by neutral vessels.
The third object is that a canal shall not be damaged, nor navigation
thereon be prevented or hampered by the opponent in case the
territorial sovereign is himself a belligerent. If the canal were not
neutralised, it could be blockaded, militarily occupied, and hostilities
could be committed there.
With these points in mind one may well ask whether it was worth while
to agree at all upon the five rules of Article III, Nos. 2-6, of the
Hay-Pauncefote Treaty if the United States were not to be considered
bound by these rules. That two years after the conclusion of the
Hay-Pauncefote Treaty the United States acquired sovereign rights over
the Canal territory and that she is at present the owner of the Canal has
not, essentially at any rate, altered the case, for Article IV of the
Hay-Pauncefote Treaty stipulates that a change of territorial
sovereignty over the Canal territory should not affect the obligation of
the contracting parties under that treaty.
If this is correct, it might be maintained that the United States is, under
the Hay-Pauncefote Treaty, subjected to more onerous conditions than
Turkey and Egypt are under the Suez Canal Treaty, for Article X of the

latter stipulates that Egypt and Turkey shall not by the injunctions of
Articles IV, V, VII, and VIII of the same treaty be considered to be
prevented from taking such measures as might be necessary to ensure
the defence of Egypt and Turkey by their own armed forces. But this
opinion would not be justified because in this respect the case of the
Panama Canal is entirely different from that of the Suez Canal.
Whereas the Panama Canal is an outlying part of the United States, and
no attack on the main territory of the United States is possible from the
Panama Canal, an attack on Egypt as well as on Turkey is quite
possible from the Suez Canal. There is, therefore, no occasion for the
United States to take such measures in the Panama Canal as might be
necessary to ensure the defence of her main territory. Indeed there
might be occasion for her to take such measures in the Canal as are
necessary to ensure the defence of the Canal and the surrounding
territory, if a belligerent threatened to attack it. Although this case is
not