The Moral Economy | Page 3

. . . . . . 123
I. THE GENERAL THEORY OF PROGRESS . . . . . . . . . . . . . 123
The philosophy of history, 123. The meaning of progress, 125. Progress and the Quantitative basis of preference, 127. The method of superimposition as a test of progress, 127.
CONTENTS
II. THE EXTERNAL AND INTERNAL PRINCIPLES OF PROGRESS . . . . 130
The external principle: the pressure of an unfavorable environment, 130. The external and the internal principle, 131. The internally progressive type of society. The importance of discussion, 132. Rationality the internal principle of progress, 134. The positive motive: constructive reform, 134. Disinterested reflection and the man of affairs, 136. Success depends on moral capacity, 137. The negative motive: revolution, 139. Christianity as a social revolution, 140. The French Revolution, 141. Dependence of progress on the historical connectedness of human life, 143.
III. CONSERVATISM AND RADICALISM . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 144
Conservatism values the existing order, 144. Progress requires the maintenance and use of order, 145. The real radical not the sceptic but the rationalist, 145. The justification of the radical, 146.
IV. PROGRESS IN THE INSTITUTION OF GOVERNMENT . . . . . . . 147
Institutions are permanent moral necessities, 147. Government as the interest both of the weak and of the strong, 148. The moral necessity of government, 150. The variable and progressive factor in government, 151. The principle of rationality in government, 152. The benefits and cost of government in the ancient military monarchy, 152. Solidarity of interest in the Greek and Roman oligarchies, 154. Advance in liberality in Athenian institutions, 156. The development of modern institutions, 157. The modern idea of democracy, 158. Summary of the modern state. It is territorial and impersonal, 160. The representative method, 160. Emphasis on internal policy and international peace, 162.
V. THE QUALITY OF CONTEMPORARY LIBERALISM . . . . . . . . . 163
Democracy based not on pity but on enlightenment, 163. The respect for the opinion of those most interested, 164. The spirit of modern justice, 165. Sensitiveness to life, 166. The allowance for growth, 167. The individual and the crowd, 168. Hopefulness and the bias of maturity, 169. The work done and the work to do, 170.
CHAPTER V
THE MORAL CRITICISM OF FINE ART . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 171
I. THE JUSTIFICATION OF THE MORAL CRITICISM OF ART . . . . . 171
The higher activities of civilization, 171. The attempt to apply aesthetic standards to life, 172. The claim of art to exemption from moral criticism is based on misapprehension. Morality not a special interest, but the fundamental interest, 174. Morality does not substitute its canons for those of art, 175.
II. DEFINITION OF ART AND THE ESTHETIC INTEREST . . . . . . 176
Art as the adaptation of the environment to interest, 176. Industrial art and fine art, 177. The aesthetic interest: the interest in apprehension, 179. The interest in sensation and perception, 181. The emotional interest, 182. Instinct and emotion in the aesthetic experience. Poetry and music, 183. The interest in discernment, 185. The representative element in art exemplified in Greek sculpture, 185. And in Italian painting of the Renaissance, 187. Levels and blendings of the aesthetic interest, 189. The moral criticism of the aesthetic interest, 190.
III. THE SELF-SUFFICIENCY OF THE AESTHETIC INTEREST . . . . 192
The aesthetic interest is capable of continuous development, 192. And is resourceful, 192. But tends on that account to be narrow and quiescent, 192.
IV. THE PERVASIVENESS OF THE ESTHETIC INTEREST . . . . . . . 194
The aesthetic interest may supply interest where there is none, or enhance other interests, 194. But it must not be allowed to replace other interests, 195.
V. THE VICARIOUS FUNCTION OF THE AESTHETIC INTEREST . . . . 197
Other interests may be represented by the aesthetic interest, 197. The danger of confusing vicarious fulfilment with real fulfilment, 198. And of being aesthetically satisfied with failure, 199.
VI. ART AS A MEANS OF STIMULATING ACTION . . . . . . . . . . 201
Art is a source of motor excitation,201. But such excitation is morally indeterminate, 201. Such influences must be selected with reference to their effect on moral purpose, 202.
VII. ART AS A MEANS OF FIXING IDEAS . . . . . . . . . . . . 203
The higher practical ideas have no other concrete embodiment than art, 203. Art both fixes ideas and arouses sentiment in their behalf, 204. But if art is to serve this end it must be true, 205. Untruth in art, 206. Universality and particularity in art, 207. Art may invest ideas with a fictitious value, 208.
VIII. THE LIBERALITY OF THE AESTHETIC INTEREST . .