The Moral Economy | Page 9

or activity whatsoever, in so far as this provides a
fulfilment of interest or desire. In the case of moral goodness this
fulfilment must embrace a group of interests in which each is limited
by the others. Its value lies not only in fulfilment, but also in
adjustment and harmony. And this value is independent of the special
subject-matter of the interests. Moralists have generally agreed that it is
impossible to conceive moral goodness exclusively in terms of any
special interest, even such as honor, power, or wealth.[4] There is no
interest so rare or so humble that its fulfilment is not morally good,
provided that fulfilment forms part of the systematic fulfilment of a
group of interests.
But there has persisted from the dawn of ethical theory a misconception
concerning the place of pleasure in moral goodness. It has been
supposed that every interest, whatever its special subject-matter, is an
interest in pleasure. Now while a thorough criticism of hedonism would
be out of place here, even if it were profitable, a summary
consideration of it will throw some light on the truth.[5] Fortunately,
the ethical status of pleasure is much clearer than its psychological
status. As a moral concern, pleasure is either a special interest, in
which case it must take its place in the whole economy of life, and
submit to principles which adjust it to the rest; or it is an {17} element

in every interest, in which case it is itself not an interest at all. Now
whether it be proper to recognize a special interest in pleasure, it is not
necessary here to determine. That this should be generally supposed to
be the case is mainly due, I think, to a habit of associating pleasure
peculiarly with certain familiar and recurrent bodily interests. At any
rate it is clear that the pleasure which constantly attends interests is not
that in which the interest is taken. Interests and desires are qualitatively
diverse, and to an extent that is unlimited. The simpler organisms are
not interested in pleasure, but in their individual preservation; while
man is interested not only in preservation, but in learning, card-playing,
loving, fighting, bargaining, and all the innumerable activities that form
part of the present complex of life.
Now, it is true that it is agreeable or pleasant to contemplate the
fulfilment of an interest; and that such anticipatory gratification in
some measure accompanies all endeavor. But there is an absolute
difference between such present pleasure and the prospect which
evokes it. And it is that prospect or imagined state of fulfilment which
is the object of endeavor, the good sought. It is also true that the
fulfilment of every interest is pleasant. But this means only that the
interest is conscious of its fulfilment. In pleasure {18} and pain life
records its gains and losses, and is guided to enhance the one or repair
the other. Where in the scale of life pleasure and pain begin it is not
now possible to say, but it is certain that they are present wherever
interests engage in any sort of reciprocity. If one interest is to control or
engage another it must be aware of it, and alive to its success or failure.
Where life has reached the human stage of complexity, in which
interests supervene upon interests, in which every interest is itself an
object of interest, the consciousness of good and evil assumes a
constantly increasing importance. Life is more watchful of itself, more
keenly sensitive to the fortunes of all of its constituent parts. It is proper,
therefore, to associate pleasure with goodness; and happiness, or a
more constant and pervasive pleasure, with the higher forms of moral
goodness. But pleasure and happiness are incidental to goodness;
necessary, but not definitive of its general form and structure.
In addition to goodness thus amplified there now enters into life at the

moral stage a new element of value, the rightness or virtue of action
which, though moved by some immediate desire, is at the same time
controlled by a regard for a higher or more comprehensive interest.
This is the distinguishing quality of all that wins moral approval: thrift
and temperance; loyalty {19} and integrity; justice, unselfishness, and
public spirit; humanity and piety. To the further discussion of these
several virtues we shall have occasion shortly to return.
Moral procedure, then, differs from life in its more elementary form,
through the fact that interests are organized. Morality is only life where
this has assumed the form of the forward movement of character,
nationality, and humanity. Moral principles define the adjustment of
interest to interest, for the saving of each and the strengthening of both
against failure and death. Morality is only the method of carrying on
the affair of life beyond a certain