The Memorabilia | Page 8

noble thou shalt be instructed in nobleness; but, and if thou
minglest with the base thou wilt destroy what wisdom thou hast now";
And he[9] who says:
"But the good man has his hour of baseness as well as his hour of
virtue"--
to whose testimony I would add my own. For I see that it is impossible
to remember a long poem without practice and repetition; so is
forgetfulness of the words of instruction engendered in the heart that
has ceased to value them. With the words of warning fades the
recollection of the very condition of mind in which the soul yearned
after holiness; and once forgetting this, what wonder that the man
should let slip also the memory of virtue itself! Again I see that a man
who falls into habits of drunkenness or plunges headlong into licentious
love, loses his old power of practising the right and abstaining from the
wrong. Many a man who has found frugality easy whilst passion was
cold, no sooner falls in love than he loses the faculty at once, and in his
prodigal expenditure of riches he will no longer withhold his hand from
gains which in former days were too base to invite his touch. Where
then is the difficulty of supposing that a man may be temperate to-day,
and to-morrow the reverse; or that he who once has had it in his power
to act virtuously may not quite lose that power?[10] To myself, at all
events, it seems that all beautiful and noble things are the result of
constant practice and training; and pre-eminently the virtue of
temperance, seeing that in one and the same bodily frame pleasures are
planted and spring up side by side with the soul and keep whispering in

her ear, "Have done with self- restraint, make haste to gratify us and the
body."[11]
[8] Theognis, 35, 36. See "Symp." ii. 4; Plat. "Men." 95 D.
[9] The author is unknown. See Plat. "Protag." l.c.
[10] Cf. "Cyrop." V. i. 9 foll.; VI. i. 41.
[11] See my remarks, "Hellenica Essays," p. 371 foll.
But to return to Critias and Alcibiades, I repeat that as long as they
lived with Socrates they were able by his support to dominate their
ignoble appetites;[12] but being separated from him, Critias had to fly
to Thessaly,[13] where he consorted with fellows better versed in
lawlessness than justice. And Alcibiades fared no better. His personal
beauty on the one hand incited bevies of fine ladies[14] to hunt him
down as fair spoil, while on the other hand his influence in the state and
among the allies exposed him to the corruption of many an adept in the
arts of flattery; honoured by the democracy and stepping easily to the
front rank he behaved like an athlete who in the games of the Palaestra
is so assured of victory that he neglects his training; thus he presently
forgot the duty which he owed himself.
[12] Cf. [Plat.] "Theag." 130 A.
[13] See "Hell." II. iii. 36.
[14] Cf. Plut. "Ages.," "Alcib."
Such were the misadventures of these two. Is the sequel extraordinary?
Inflated with the pride of ancestry,[15] exalted by their wealth, puffed
up by power, sapped to the soul's core by a host of human tempters,
separate moreover for many a long day from Socrates--what wonder
that they reached the full stature of arrogancy! And for the offences of
these two Socrates is to be held responsible! The accuser will have it so.
But for the fact that in early days, when they were both young and of an
age when dereliction from good feeling and self- restraint might have
been expected, this same Socrates kept them modest and well-behaved,
not one word of praise is uttered by the accuser for all this. That is not
the measure of justice elsewhere meted. Would a master of the harp or
flute, would a teacher of any sort who has turned out proficient pupils,
be held to account because one of them goes away to another teacher
and turns out to be a failure? Or what father, if he have a son who in the
society of a certain friend remains an honest lad, but falling into the
company of some other becomes a good-for-nothing, will that father

straightway accuse the earlier instructor? Will not he rather, in
proportion as the boy deteriorates in the company of the latter, bestow
more heartfelt praise upon the former? What father, himself sharing the
society of his own children, is held to blame for their transgressions, if
only his own goodness be established? Here would have been a fair test
to apply to Socrates: Was he guilty of any base conduct himself? If so
let him be set down as a knave, but if,