The Memorabilia | Page 5

fool. He would ask first: Did these investigators feel
their knowledge of things human so complete that they betook
themselves to these lofty speculations? Or did they maintain that they
were playing their proper parts in thus neglecting the affairs of man to
speculate on the concerns of God? He was astonished they did not see
how far these problems lay beyond mortal ken; since even those who
pride themselves most on their discussion of these points differ from
each other, as madmen do. For just as some madmen, he said, have no
apprehension of what is truly terrible, others fear where no fear is;
some are ready to say and do anything in public without the slightest
symptom of shame;[10] others think they ought not so much as to set
foot among their fellow-men; some honour neither temple, nor altar,
nor aught else sacred to the name of God; others bow down to stocks
and stones and worship the very beasts:--so is it with those thinkers
whose minds are cumbered with cares[11] concerning the Universal
Nature. One sect[12] has discovered that Being is one and indivisible.
Another[13] that it is infinite in number. If one[14] proclaims that all
things are in a continual flux, another[15] replies that nothing can
possibly be moved at any time. The theory of the universe as a process
of birth and death is met by the counter theory, that nothing ever could

be born or ever will die.
[8] Lit. "the sophists." See H. Sidgwick, "J. of Philol." iv. 1872; v.
1874.
[9] Reading {ephu}. Cf. Lucian, "Icaromenip." xlvi. 4, in imitation of
this passage apparently; or if {ekhei}, translate "is arranged." See Grote,
"H. G." viii. 573.
[10] See "Anab." V. iv. 30.
[11] See Arist. "Clouds," 101, {merimnophrontistai kaloi te kagathoi}.
[12] e.g. Xenophanes and Parmenides, see Grote, "Plato," I. i. 16 foll.
[13] e.g. Leucippus and Democritus, ib. 63 foll.
[14] e.g. Heraclitus, ib. 27 foll.
[15] e.g. Zeno, ib. ii. 96.
But the questioning of Socrates on the merits of these speculators
sometimes took another form. The student of human learning expects,
he said, to make something of his studies for the benefit of himself or
others, as he likes. Do these explorers into the divine operations hope
that when they have discovered by what forces the various phenomena
occur, they will create winds and waters at will and fruitful seasons?
Will they manipulate these and the like to suit their needs? or has no
such notion perhaps ever entered their heads, and will they be content
simply to know how such things come into existence? But if this was
his mode of describing those who meddle with such matters as these,
he himself never wearied of discussing human topics. What is piety?
what is impiety? What is the beautiful? what the ugly? What the noble?
what the base? What are meant by just and unjust? what by sobriety
and madness? what by courage and cowardice? What is a state? what is
a statesman? what is a ruler over men? what is a ruling character? and
other like problems, the knowledge of which, as he put it, conferred a
patent of nobility on the possessor,[16] whereas those who lacked the
knowledge might deservedly be stigmatised as slaves.
[16] Or, "was distinctive of the 'beautiful and good.'" For the phrase see
below, ii. 2 et passim.
Now, in so far as the opinions of Socrates were unknown to the world
at large, it is not surprising that the court should draw false conclusions
respecting them; but that facts patent to all should have been ignored is
indeed astonishing.
At one time Socrates was a member of the Council,[17] he had taken

the senatorial oath, and sworn "as a member of that house to act in
conformity with the laws." It was thus he chanced to be President of the
Popular Assembly,[18] when that body was seized with a desire to put
the nine[19] generals, Thrasyllus, Erasinides, and the rest, to death by a
single inclusive vote. Whereupon, in spite of the bitter resentment of
the people, and the menaces of several influential citizens, he refused to
put the question, esteeming it of greater importance faithfully to abide
by the oath which he had taken, than to gratify the people wrongfully,
or to screen himself from the menaces of the mighty. The fact being,
that with regard to the care bestowed by the gods upon men, his belief
differed widely from that of the multitude. Whereas most people seem
to imagine that the gods know in part, and are ignorant in part, Socrates
believed firmly that the gods know all things--both the things that are
said and the things that are done, and the things that are counselled in
the silent chambers of the