The Major Operations of the Navies in the War of American Independence | Page 8

but efficient
schoolmaster of that large portion of mankind which gains knowledge
only by hard knocks, had confirmed through the preceding French wars

the inferences of the thoughtful. Therefore, conscious of the great
superiority of the British Navy, which, however, had not then attained
the unchallenged supremacy of a later day, the American leaders early
sought the alliance of the Bourbon kingdoms, France and Spain, the
hereditary enemies of Great Britain. There alone could be found the
counterpoise to a power which, if unchecked, must ultimately prevail.
Nearly three years elapsed before the Colonists accomplished this
object, by giving a demonstration of their strength in the enforced
surrender of Burgoyne's army at Saratoga. This event has merited the
epithet "decisive," because, and only because, it decided the
intervention of France. It may be affirmed, with little hesitation, that
this victory of the colonists was directly the result of naval force,--that
of the colonists themselves. It was the cause that naval force from
abroad, entering into the contest, transformed it from a local to a
universal war, and assured the independence of the Colonies. That the
Americans were strong enough to impose the capitulation of Saratoga,
was due to the invaluable year of delay secured to them by their little
navy on Lake Champlain, created by the indomitable energy, and
handled with the indomitable courage, of the traitor, Benedict Arnold.
That the war spread from America to Europe, from the English Channel
to the Baltic, from the Bay of Biscay to the Mediterranean, from the
West Indies to the Mississippi, and ultimately involved the waters of
the remote peninsula of Hindustan, is traceable, through Saratoga, to
the rude flotilla which in 1776 anticipated its enemy in the possession
of Lake Champlain. The events which thus culminated merit therefore a
clearer understanding, and a fuller treatment, than their intrinsic
importance and petty scale would justify otherwise.
In 1775, only fifteen years had elapsed since the expulsion of the
French from the North American continent. The concentration of their
power, during its continuance, in the valley of the St. Lawrence, had
given direction to the local conflict, and had impressed upon men's
minds the importance of Lake Champlain, of its tributary Lake George,
and of the Hudson River, as forming a consecutive, though not
continuous, water line of communications from the St. Lawrence to
New York. The strength of Canada against attack by land lay in its

remoteness, in the wilderness to be traversed before it was reached, and
in the strength of the line of the St. Lawrence, with the fortified posts of
Montreal and Quebec on its northern bank. The wilderness, it is true,
interposed its passive resistance to attacks from Canada as well as to
attacks upon it; but when it had been traversed, there were to the
southward no such strong natural positions confronting the assailant.
Attacks from the south fell upon the front, or at best upon the flank, of
the line of the St. Lawrence. Attacks from Canada took New York and
its dependencies in the rear.
[Illustration]
These elements of natural strength, in the military conditions of the
North, were impressed upon the minds of the Americans by the
prolonged resistance of Canada to the greatly superior numbers of the
British Colonists in the previous wars. Regarded, therefore, as a base
for attacks, of a kind with which they were painfully familiar, but to be
undergone now under disadvantages of numbers and power never
before experienced, it was desirable to gain possession of the St.
Lawrence and its posts before they were strengthened and garrisoned.
At this outset of hostilities, the American insurgents, knowing clearly
their own minds, possessed the advantage of the initiative over the
British government, which still hesitated to use against those whom it
styled rebels the preventive measures it would have taken at once
against a recognised enemy.
Under these circumstances, in May, 1775, a body of two hundred and
seventy Americans, led by Ethan Allen and Benedict Arnold, seized the
posts of Ticonderoga and Crown Point, which were inadequately
garrisoned. These are on the upper waters of Lake Champlain, where it
is less than a third of a mile wide; Ticonderoga being on a peninsula
formed by the lake and the inlet from Lake George, Crown Point on a
promontory twelve miles lower down.[1] They were positions of
recognised importance, and had been advanced posts of the British in
previous wars. A schooner being found there, Arnold, who had been a
seaman, embarked in her and hurried to the foot of the lake. The wind
failed him when still thirty miles from St. John's, another fortified post

on the lower narrows, where the lake gradually tapers down to the
Richelieu River, its outlet to the St. Lawrence. Unable to advance
otherwise, Arnold took to