The Life of George Washington, Vol. 3 | Page 7

partial engagement, and supposed that nothing further would be
attempted than merely to reconnoitre the enemy, and restrain
plundering parties, he showed no inclination to assert his claim.
Unintentionally promoting the private wishes of General Washington,
that the command should be given to an officer whose view of the
service comported more with his own, Lee yielded this important tour
of duty to Lafayette. The orders given to this general were, to proceed
immediately with the detachment; and, after forming a junction with
General Scott, and taking command of the troops on the lines, to gain
the enemy's left flank and rear; give him every practicable annoyance;
and attack by detachment, or with his whole force, as the occasion
might require.
These dispositions and orders could scarcely fail to bring on an
engagement. Wayne had openly supported that measure; and Lafayette,
though against seeking a general action, had been in favour of a partial
one. Of consequence, should any proper occasion offer, he would
certainly attack with his whole force, which would as certainly produce

such a state of things as would render it proper to support him with the
whole army.
[Sidenote: June 26.]
Immediately after the march of this detachment, General Washington
moved to Cranberry, that he might be in readiness to support his front
division.
The intense heat of the weather; a heavy storm; and a temporary want
of provisions, prevented the army from continuing its march that day.
The advanced corps had pressed forward, and taken a position about
five miles in rear of the British army, with the intention of attacking it
next morning on its march. Thinking this corps too remote to be
supported in case of action, General Washington ordered the Marquis
to file off by his left towards Englishtown. These orders were executed
early in the morning of the twenty-seventh.
[Sidenote: June 27.]
Lafayette had scarcely taken command of the advanced party, when
General Lee began to regret having yielded it to him. He perceived that,
in the opinion of all the general officers, great importance was attached
to it, and that his reputation was in danger of being impaired by
connecting his strenuous opposition to even a partial action, with his
declining the command of a very strong detachment, which, it was
believed, would engage the rear of the enemy. He therefore solicited
earnestly for the command he had before declined.
To relieve the feelings of Lee, without wounding those of Lafayette,
General Washington detached him with two additional brigades to
Englishtown, to support the Marquis. He would, of course, have the
direction of the whole front division, which would now amount to five
thousand continental troops; but it was expressly stipulated, that if any
enterprise had been already formed by Lafayette, it should be carried
into execution, as if the commanding officer had not been changed. Lee
acceded to this condition; and, with two additional brigades, joined the
front division of the army, encamped at Englishtown. The rear division

also moved forward, and encamped about three miles in his rear.
Morgan's corps still hovered on the right flank of the British, and
General Dickenson on their left.
Sir Henry Clinton occupied the high grounds about Monmouth
court-house, having his right flank in the skirt of a small wood, while
his left was secured by a very thick one, and a morass running towards
his rear. His whole front was also covered by a wood, and for a
considerable distance towards his left, by a morass.
This position seemed unassailable; and the British were within twelve
miles of the high grounds about Middletown, after reaching which they
would be perfectly secure.
Under these circumstances, General Washington ordered Lee to attack
the British rear the moment it should move from its ground.
[Sidenote: June 28.]
About five in the morning, intelligence was received from General
Dickenson that the front of the enemy was in motion. The troops were
immediately put under arms, and Lee was ordered to attack the rear,
"unless there should be powerful reasons to the contrary." He was at the
same time informed that the rear division would be on its march to
support him.
Sir Henry Clinton had observed the appearances on his flanks and rear
on the twenty-seventh; and, conjecturing that the American army was
in his neighbourhood, had changed the order of his march. The baggage
was placed under the care of General Knyphausen, while the strength
and flower of his army, entirely unincumbered, formed the rear division,
under the particular command of Lord Cornwallis, who was
accompanied by the Commander-in-chief.
To avoid pressing on Knyphausen, Cornwallis remained on his ground
until about eight; and then, descending from the heights of Freehold
into an extensive plain, took up his line of march in rear of the front
division.[7]

[Footnote