The Life of George Washington, Vol. 3 | Page 5

cut off the only retreat which remained for him. But the same skill
and address were not displayed in executing this plan as in forming
it.[5]
[Footnote 5: It has been said that his troops were excessively fatigued
by a march of upwards of twenty miles, and that he waited, confident
that the Marquis could not escape him, for information that Gray had
reached his position.]
In the statement of this affair made by General Lafayette, he represents

himself to have advanced the head of a column towards Grant, as if to
attack him, while the rear filed off rapidly towards the Schuylkill. This
movement gained ground even for the front, which, while it advanced
towards the enemy, also approached the river, and at the same time
induced General Grant to halt, in order to prepare for battle.
While this manoeuvre was performing in the face of the detachment
under Grant, a small party was thrown into the church yard, on the road
towards General Gray, which also gave the appearance of an intention
to attack in that quarter. By these dispositions, happily conceived, and
executed with regularity, the Marquis extricated himself from the
destruction which had appeared almost inevitable. In a letter to
congress, General Washington termed it "a timely and handsome
retreat," and certainly the compliment was merited.
It might be supposed that this young nobleman had not displayed the
same degree of military talent in guarding against the approach of
danger, as in extricating himself from it. But the imputation which
generally attaches to an officer who permits an enemy to pass
unobserved into his rear, is removed by a circumstance stated by
Lafayette. The Pennsylvania militia were posted on his left flank with
orders to guard the roads about White Marsh. Without his knowledge,
they changed their position, and retired into the rear, leaving that
important pass open to the enemy.
[Sidenote: General Howe resigns his command and returns to England;
is succeeded by Sir Henry Clinton.]
This was the last enterprise attempted by Sir William Howe. He
resigned the command of the army into the hands of Sir Henry Clinton,
and embarked for Great Britain. About the same time, orders were
received for the evacuation of Philadelphia. The part it was now
evident France was about to take in the war, and the naval force which
had been prepared by that power before she declared herself, rendered
that city a dangerous position, and determined the administration to
withdraw the army from the Delaware.
The preparations for this movement could not be made unobserved; but

they indicated equally an embarkation of the whole army, or an
intention to march to New York through Jersey. The last was believed
by the American chief to be most probable; and he made every exertion
to take advantage of the movement. His detachments were called in,
and the state governments were pressed to expedite the march of their
levies.
In the mean time Sir Henry Clinton hastened his preparations for the
evacuation of Philadelphia; and the opinion that he intended to reach
New York through Jersey, gained ground.
General Maxwell, with the Jersey brigade, was ordered over the
Delaware to take post at Mount Holly, and to join Major General
Dickenson, who was assembling the militia of that state for the purpose
of co-operating with the continental troops, in breaking down the
bridges, felling trees in the roads, and otherwise embarrassing the
march of the British General.
[Sidenote: June 17.]
In this state of things intelligence was received that a great part of the
British army had crossed the Delaware, and that the residue would soon
follow.
The opinion of the general officers was required on the course now to
be pursued. General Lee, who had been lately exchanged, and whose
experience gave great weight to his opinions, was vehement against
risking either a general or partial engagement. The British army was
computed at ten thousand effective men, and that of the Americans
amounted to between ten and eleven thousand. General Lee was
decidedly of opinion that, with such an equality of force, it would be
"criminal" to hazard an action. He relied much on the advantageous
ground on which their late foreign connexions had placed the United
States, and contended that defeat alone could now endanger their
independence. To this he said the army ought not to be exposed. It
would be impossible he thought to bring on a partial action, without
risking its being made general, should such be the choice of the enemy,
since the detachment which might engage must be supported, or be cut

to pieces. A general action ought not to be fought unless the advantage
was manifestly with the American army. This at present was not the
case. He attributed so much to the superior discipline of