was of old said to
have done at Cannae, amid the fierce shock of mortal foes in that
narrow field.
The respect for authority which had so long been the distinguishing
characteristic of the Netherlanders seemed to have disappeared. It was
difficult--now that the time-honoured laws and privileges in defence of
which, and of liberty of worship included in them, the Provinces had
made war forty years long had been trampled upon by military
force--for those not warmed by the fire of Gomarus to feel their ancient
respect for the magistracy. The magistracy at that moment seemed to
mean the sword.
The Spanish government was inevitably encouraged by the spectacle
thus presented. We have seen the strong hopes entertained by the
council at Madrid, two years before the crisis now existing had
occurred. We have witnessed the eagerness with which the King
indulged the dream of recovering the sovereignty which his father had
lost, and the vast schemes which he nourished towards that purpose,
founded on the internal divisions which were reducing the Republic to
impotence. Subsequent events had naturally made him more sanguine
than ever. There was now a web of intrigue stretching through the
Provinces to bring them all back under the sceptre of Spain. The
imprisonment of the great stipendiary, the great conspirator, the man
who had sold himself and was on the point of selling his country, had
not terminated those plots. Where was the supposed centre of that
intrigue? In the council of state of the Netherlands, ever fiercely
opposed to Barneveld and stuffed full of his mortal enemies. Whose
name was most familiar on the lips of the Spanish partisans engaged in
these secret schemes? That of Adrian Manmaker, President of the
Council, representative of Prince Maurice as first noble of Zealand in
the States-General, chairman of the committee sent by that body to
Utrecht to frustrate the designs of the Advocate, and one of the
twenty-four commissioners soon to be appointed to sit in judgment
upon him.
The tale seems too monstrous for belief, nor is it to be admitted with
certainty, that Manmaker and the other councillors implicated had
actually given their adhesion to the plot, because the Spanish
emissaries in their correspondence with the King assured him of the
fact. But if such a foundation for suspicion could have been found
against Barneveld and his friends, the world would not have heard the
last of it from that hour to this.
It is superfluous to say that the Prince was entirely foreign to these
plans. He had never been mentioned as privy to the little arrangements
of Councillor du Agean and others, although he was to benefit by them.
In the Spanish schemes he seems to have been considered as an
impediment, although indirectly they might tend to advance him.
"We have managed now, I hope, that his Majesty will be recognized as
sovereign of the country," wrote the confidential agent of the King of
Spain in the Netherlands, Emmanuel Sueyro, to the government of
Madrid. "The English will oppose it with all their strength. But they can
do nothing except by making Count Maurice sovereign of Holland and
duke of Julich and Cleve. Maurice will also contrive to make himself
master of Wesel, so it is necessary for the Archduke to be beforehand
with him and make sure of the place. It is also needful that his Majesty
should induce the French government to talk with the Netherlanders
and convince them that it is time to prolong the Truce."
This was soon afterwards accomplished. The French minister at
Brussels informed Archduke Albert that du Maurier had been instructed
to propose the prolongation, and that he had been conferring with the
Prince of Orange and the States-General on the subject. At first the
Prince had expressed disinclination, but at the last interview both he
and the States had shown a desire for it, and the French King had
requested from the Archduke a declaration whether the Spanish
government would be willing to treat for it. In such case Lewis would
offer himself as mediator and do his best to bring about a successful
result.
But it was not the intention of the conspirators in the Netherlands that
the Truce should be prolonged. On the contrary the negotiation for it
was merely to furnish the occasion for fully developing their plot. "The
States and especially those of Zealand will reply that they no longer
wish the Truce," continued Sueyro, "and that they would prefer war to
such a truce. They desire to put ships on the coast of Flanders, to which
the Hollanders are opposed because it would be disagreeable to the
French. So the Zealanders will be the first to say that the Netherlanders
must come back to his Majesty. This their President
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