The Laws of War, Affecting Commerce and Shipping | Page 2

of Nations."
It is to the Maritime Courts, then, of this and other countries, that the
hopes of civilization must look for improvement and advance in the
canons of international intercourse during the unhappy time of war. The
manner, and the feeling in which they are to pronounce those canons
cannot be more finely enunciated than in the words of Lord Stowell
himself.
"I consider myself as stationed here, not to deliver occasional and
shifting opinions to serve present purposes of particular national
interest, but to administer with indifference that justice which the Law
of Nations holds out, without distinction, to independent states, some

happening to be neutral, and some belligerent.
"The seat of judicial authority is indeed locally here in the belligerent
country, according to the known law and practice of nations; but the
law itself has no locality. It is the duty of the person who sits here to
determine this question exactly as he would determine the same
question, if sitting at Stockholm; to assert no pretensions on the part of
Great Britain, which he would not allow to Sweden in the same
circumstances; and to impose no duties on Sweden, as a neutral country,
which he would not admit to belong to _Great Britain_, in the same
character. If, therefore, I mistake the law in this matter, I mistake that
which I consider, and which I mean should be considered, as
UNIVERSAL LAW upon the question."
When an Admiralty Judge investigates the law in this impartial spirit,
he occupies the grand position of being in some respects the director of
the deeds of nations; but with equal certainty does the taint of an unjust
bias poison all his authority; his judgments are powerful then only for
evil; they bind no one beyond the country in which he sits, and may
become the motive and origin of reprisal and attack upon his native
land.
As the authority of the international judge depends on his integrity, so
also does the universal law arise from, and remain supported by, the
true principles of right and justice; in other words, by the fundamental
distinction between right and wrong. A statute, a despotic prerogative,
and an established principle of common law, rest upon different
sanctions. They may be the causes of the greatest injustice, may sow
the seeds of national ruin, and yet may even require revolutions for
their reformation; but any one of the laws of nations preserves its
vitality, only with the essential truth of its principles; a change in the
feeling of mankind on the great question of real justice, destroys it, and
it simply remains an historical record of departed opinion, or a point
from which to date an advance or retreat in the career of the human
mind.
It is for this reason that International Law has been so differently
defined by writers at various periods.

The Law of Nations is _founded_, I have said, on the general principles
of right and justice, on the broad fundamental distinctions between
right and wrong, or as Montesquieu defines it, "on the principle that
nations ought in time of peace to do each as much good, and in time of
war as little harm as possible." These are the principles from which any
rule must be shown to spring, before it can be said to be a rule for
international guidance. But what are the principles of right and wrong?
These are not left to the individual reason of the interpreter of the law
for the time being, but are to be decided by the _public opinion of the
civilized world_, as it stands at the time when the case arises.
It may immediately be asked--How is that public opinion to be
ascertained? The answer is--By ascertaining the differences in opinion
between the present and the past. For this purpose it must be observed,
that the views of a past age are easily ascertainable, in matters of law,
from theoretical writings, history, and judicial decisions; and these
views may be reduced to definition. Modern universal intelligence will
either agree or disagree in these views. In the mass of instances it will
agree, as progress on such points is at all times slow; and not only will
the points of disagreement be few, but they will be salient, striking, and
generally of popular notoriety. Present, universal, or international
opinion, has therefore two portions. 1. That in which it accords with the
views of a past generation, that has become historical. 2. That in which
it differs from, or contradicts those views.
In the first instance, then, we are to ascertain what were the principles
of right and justice, from any materials handed down to us; and if those
principles agree with, or support the practical rules recorded by the
same, or similar