The Influence of Sea Power Upon History, 1660-1783 | Page 9

resemblance, though existing and easy to
find, are not so obvious, and therefore are less heeded. This impression
is enhanced by the sense of utter weakness in the sailing-ship as
compared with the steamer, owing to its dependence upon the wind;
forgetting that, as the former fought with its equals, the tactical lessons
are valid. The galley was never reduced to impotence by a calm, and
hence receives more respect in our day than the sailing-ship; yet the
latter displaced it and remained supreme until the utilization of steam.
The powers to injure an enemy from a great distance, to manoeuvre for
an unlimited length of time without wearing out the men, to devote the
greater part of the crew to the offensive weapons instead of to the oar,
are common to the sailing vessel and the steamer, and are at least as
important, tactically considered, as the power of the galley to move in a
calm or against the wind.
In tracing resemblances there is a tendency not only to overlook points
of difference, but to exaggerate points of likeness,--to be fanciful. It
may be so considered to point out that as the sailing-ship had guns of
long range, with comparatively great penetrative power, and carronades,
which were of shorter range but great smashing effect, so the modern
steamer has its batteries of long-range guns and of torpedoes, the latter
being effective only within a limited distance and then injuring by
smashing, while the gun, as of old, aims at penetration. Yet these are
distinctly tactical considerations, which must affect the plans of
admirals and captains; and the analogy is real, not forced. So also both
the sailing-ship and the steamer contemplate direct contact with an
enemy's vessel,--the former to carry her by boarding, the latter to sink
her by ramming; and to both this is the most difficult of their tasks, for
to effect it the ship must be carried to a single point of the field of
action, whereas projectile weapons may be used from many points of a
wide area.
The relative positions of two sailing-ships, or fleets, with reference to
the direction of the wind involved most important tactical questions,
and were perhaps the chief care of the seamen of that age. To a

superficial glance it may appear that since this has become a matter of
such indifference to the steamer, no analogies to it are to be found in
present conditions, and the lessons of history in this respect are
valueless. A more careful consideration of the distinguishing
characteristics of the lee and the weather "gage,"[3] directed to their
essential features and disregarding secondary details, will show that
this is a mistake. The distinguishing feature of the weather-gage was
that it conferred the power of giving or refusing battle at will, which in
turn carries the usual advantage of an offensive attitude in the choice of
the method of attack. This advantage was accompanied by certain
drawbacks, such as irregularity introduced into the order, exposure to
raking or enfilading cannonade, and the sacrifice of part or all of the
artillery-fire of the assailant,--all which were incurred in approaching
the enemy. The ship, or fleet, with the lee-gage could not attack; if it
did not wish to retreat, its action was confined to the defensive, and to
receiving battle on the enemy's terms. This disadvantage was
compensated by the comparative ease of maintaining the order of battle
undisturbed, and by a sustained artillery-fire to which the enemy for a
time was unable to reply. Historically, these favorable and unfavorable
characteristics have their counterpart and analogy in the offensive and
defensive operations of all ages. The offence undertakes certain risks
and disadvantages in order to reach and destroy the enemy; the defence,
so long as it remains such, refuses the risks of advance, holds on to a
careful, well-ordered position, and avails itself of the exposure to which
the assailant submits himself. These radical differences between the
weather and the lee gage were so clearly recognized, through the cloud
of lesser details accompanying them, that the former was ordinarily
chosen by the English, because their steady policy was to assail and
destroy their enemy; whereas the French sought the lee-gage, because
by so doing they were usually able to cripple the enemy as he
approached, and thus evade decisive encounters and preserve their
ships. The French, with rare exceptions, subordinated the action of the
navy to other military considerations, grudged the money spent upon it,
and therefore sought to economize their fleet by assuming a defensive
position and limiting its efforts to the repelling of assaults. For this
course the lee-gage, skilfully used, was admirably adapted so long as an
enemy displayed more courage than conduct; but when Rodney showed

an intention to use the advantage of