The Influence of Sea Power Upon History, 1660-1783 | Page 2

which was Hannibal's base, and Italy, while the issue of the decisive
battle of the Metaurus, hinging as it did upon the interior position of the
Roman armies with reference to the forces of Hasdrubal and Hannibal,
was ultimately due to the fact that the younger brother could not bring
his succoring reinforcements by sea, but only by the land route through
Gaul. Hence at the critical moment the two Carthaginian armies were
separated by the length of Italy, and one was destroyed by the
combined action of the Roman generals.
On the other hand, naval historians have troubled themselves little
about the connection between general history and their own particular
topic, limiting themselves generally to the duty of simple chroniclers of
naval occurrences. This is less true of the French than of the English;
the genius and training of the former people leading them to more
careful inquiry into the causes of particular results and the mutual
relation of events.
There is not, however, within the knowledge of the author any work
that professes the particular object here sought; namely, an estimate of
the effect of sea power upon the course of history and the prosperity of

nations. As other histories deal with the wars, politics, social and
economical conditions of countries, touching upon maritime matters
only incidentally and generally unsympathetically, so the present work
aims at putting maritime interests in the foreground, without divorcing
them, however, from their surroundings of cause and effect in general
history, but seeking to show how they modified the latter, and were
modified by them.
The period embraced is from 1660, when the sailing-ship era, with its
distinctive features, had fairly begun, to 1783, the end of the American
Revolution. While the thread of general history upon which the
successive maritime events is strung is intentionally slight, the effort
has been to present a clear as well as accurate outline. Writing as a
naval officer in full sympathy with his profession, the author has not
hesitated to digress freely on questions of naval policy, strategy, and
tactics; but as technical language has been avoided, it is hoped that
these matters, simply presented, will be found of interest to the
unprofessional reader.
A. T. MAHAN
DECEMBER, 1889.

CONTENTS.
INTRODUCTORY.
History of Sea Power one of contest between nations, therefore largely
military 1 Permanence of the teachings of history 2 Unsettled condition
of modern naval opinion 2 Contrasts between historical classes of
war-ships 2 Essential distinction between weather and lee gage 5
Analogous to other offensive and defensive positions 6 Consequent
effect upon naval policy 6 Lessons of history apply especially to
strategy 7 Less obviously to tactics, but still applicable 9
ILLUSTRATIONS: The battle of the Nile, A.D. 1798 10 Trafalgar,
A.D. 1805 11 Siege of Gibraltar, A.D. 1779-1782 12 Actium, B.C. 31,

and Lepanto, A.D. 1571 13 Second Punic War, B.C. 218-201 14
Naval strategic combinations surer now than formerly 22 Wide scope
of naval strategy 22
CHAPTER I.
DISCUSSION OF THE ELEMENTS OF SEA POWER.
The sea a great common 25 Advantages of water-carriage over that by
land 25 Navies exist for the protection of commerce 26 Dependence of
commerce upon secure seaports 27 Development of colonies and
colonial posts 28 Links in the chain of Sea Power: production, shipping,
colonies 28 General conditions affecting Sea Power: I. Geographical
position 29 II. Physical conformation 35 III. Extent of territory 42 IV.
Number of population 44 V. National character 50 VI. Character and
policy of governments 58 England 59 Holland 67 France 69 Influence
of colonies on Sea Power 82 The United States: Its weakness in Sea
Power 83 Its chief interest in internal development 84 Danger from
blockades 85 Dependence of the navy upon the shipping interest 87
Conclusion of the discussion of the elements of Sea Power 88 Purpose
of the historical narrative 89
CHAPTER II.
STATE OF EUROPE IN 1660.--SECOND ANGLO-DUTCH WAR,
1665-1667.--SEA BATTLES OF LOWESTOFT AND OF THE FOUR
DAYS
Accession of Charles II. and Louis XIV. 90 Followed shortly by
general wars 91 French policy formulated by Henry IV. and Richelieu
92 Condition of France in 1660 93 Condition of Spain 94 Condition of
the Dutch United Provinces 96 Their commerce and colonies 97
Character of their government 98 Parties in the State 99 Condition of
England in 1660 99 Characteristics of French, English, and Dutch ships
101 Conditions of other European States 102 Louis XIV. the leading
personality in Europe 103 His policy 104 Colbert's administrative acts

105 Second Anglo-Dutch War, 1665 107 Battle of Lowestoft, 1665 108
Fire-ships, compared with torpedo-cruisers 109 The group formation
112 The order of battle for sailing-ships 115 The Four Days' Battle,
1666 117 Military merits of the opposing fleets 126 Soldiers
commanding fleets, discussion 127 Ruyter in the Thames, 1667 132
Peace