The Influence of Sea Power Upon History, 1660-1783 | Page 7

the West Indies 516 In the East Indies 518 Strategic bearing of the trade-winds and monsoons 518 The bases abroad generally deficient in resources 519 Consequent increased importance of the communications 519 The navies the guardians of the communications 520 Need of intermediate ports between Europe and India 520 Inquiry into the disposition of the naval forces 521 Difficulty of obtaining information at sea 521 Perplexity as to the destination of a naval expedition 522 Disadvantages of the defensive 523 England upon the defensive in 1778 523 Consequent necessity for wise and vigorous action 524 The key of the situation 525 British naval policy in the Napoleonic wars 525 British naval policy in the Seven Years' War 527 Difficulties attending this policy 527 Disposition of the British navy in the war of 1778 528 Resulting inferiority on many critical occasions 528 Effect on the navy of the failure to fortify naval bases 529 The distribution of the British navy exposes it to being out-numbered at many points 531 The British naval policy in 1778 and in other wars compared 532 Naval policy of the allies 535 Divergent counsels of the coalition 536 "Ulterior objects" 537 The allied navies systematically assume a defensive attitude 538 Dangers of this line of action 538 Glamour of commerce-destroying 539 The conditions of peace, 1783 540
INDEX 543

LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS.
LIST OF MAPS.
I. Mediterranean Sea 15 II. English Channel and North Sea 107 III. Indian Peninsula and Ceylon 257 IV. North Atlantic Ocean 532
PLANS OF NAVAL BATTLES.
In these plans, when the capital letters A, B, C, and D are used, all positions marked by the same capital are simultaneous.
I. Four Days' Battle, 1666 119 II. Four Days' Battle, 1666 124 III. Battle of Solebay, 1672 146 IV. Battle of the Texel, 1673 153 V. Battle of Stromboli, 1676 161 V a. Pocock and D'Ach��, 1758 161 VI. Battle of Beachy Head, 1690 183 VI a. Battle of La Hougue, 1692 183 VII. Matthews's Action off Toulon, 1744 265 VII a. Byng's Action off Minorca, 1756 265 VIII. Hawke and Conflans, 1759 303 IX. Battle of Ushant, 1778 351 X. D'Estaing and Byron, 1779 368 XI. Rodney and De Guichen, April 17, 1780 378 XII. Arbuthnot and Destouches, 1781 386 XIII. Suffren at Porto Praya, 1781 423 XIV. Suffren and Hughes, February 17, 1782 431 XV. Suffren and Hughes, April 12, 1782 438 XVI. Suffren and Hughes, July 6, 1782 447 XVII. Suffren and Hughes, September 3, 1782 454 XVIII. Hood and De Grasse, January, 1782 470 XIX. Hood and De Grasse, January, 1782 472 XX. Rodney and De Grasse, April 9, 1782 482 XXI. Rodney's Victory, April 12, 1782 486

INFLUENCE
OF
SEA POWER UPON HISTORY.

INTRODUCTORY.
The history of Sea Power is largely, though by no means solely, a narrative of contests between nations, of mutual rivalries, of violence frequently culminating in war. The profound influence of sea commerce upon the wealth and strength of countries was clearly seen long before the true principles which governed its growth and prosperity were detected. To secure to one's own people a disproportionate share of such benefits, every effort was made to exclude others, either by the peaceful legislative methods of monopoly or prohibitory regulations, or, when these failed, by direct violence. The clash of interests, the angry feelings roused by conflicting attempts thus to appropriate the larger share, if not the whole, of the advantages of commerce, and of distant unsettled commercial regions, led to wars. On the other hand, wars arising from other causes have been greatly modified in their conduct and issue by the control of the sea. Therefore the history of sea power, while embracing in its broad sweep all that tends to make a people great upon the sea or by the sea, is largely a military history; and it is in this aspect that it will be mainly, though not exclusively, regarded in the following pages.
A study of the military history of the past, such as this, is enjoined by great military leaders as essential to correct ideas and to the skilful conduct of war in the future. Napoleon names among the campaigns to be studied by the aspiring soldier, those of Alexander, Hannibal, and C?sar, to whom gunpowder was unknown; and there is a substantial agreement among professional writers that, while many of the conditions of war vary from age to age with the progress of weapons, there are certain teachings in the school of history which remain constant, and being, therefore, of universal application, can be elevated to the rank of general principles. For the same reason the study of the sea history of the past will be found instructive, by its illustration of the general principles of maritime war, notwithstanding the great changes that have been brought about in naval weapons by the scientific advances