The Idea Of Progress | Page 4

presence of forces of which,
unlike gravitation, we have no terrestrial experience? It is an
assumption, which cannot be verified, that we shall not soon reach a
point in our knowledge of nature beyond which the human intellect is
unqualified to pass.
But it is just this assumption which is the light and inspiration of man's
scientific research. For if the assumption is not true, it means that he
can never come within sight of the goal which is, in the case of
physical science, if not a complete knowledge of the cosmos and the
processes of nature, at least an immeasurably larger and deeper
knowledge than we at present possess.
Thus continuous progress in man's knowledge of his environment,
which is one of the chief conditions of general Progress, is a hypothesis
which may or may not be true. And if it is true, there remains the
further hypothesis of man's moral and social "perfectibility," which
rests on much less impressive evidence. There is nothing to show that
he may not reach, in his psychical and social development, a stage at
which the conditions of his life will be still far from satisfactory, and
beyond which he will find it impossible to progress. This is a question

of fact which no willing on man's part can alter. It is a question bearing
on the mystery of life.
Enough has been said to show that the Progress of humanity belongs to
the same order of ideas as Providence or personal immortality. It is true
or it is false, and like them it cannot be proved either true or false.
Belief in it is an act of faith.
The idea of human Progress then is a theory which involves a synthesis
of the past and a prophecy of the future. It is based on an interpretation
of history which regards men as slowly advancing-- pedetemtim
progredientes--in a definite and desirable direction, and infers that this
progress will continue indefinitely. And it implies that, as
The issue of the earth's great business,
a condition of general happiness will ultimately be enjoyed, which will
justify the whole process of civilisation; for otherwise the direction
would not be desirable. There is also a further implication. The process
must be the necessary outcome of the psychical and social nature of
man; it must not be at the mercy of any external will; otherwise there
would be no guarantee of its continuance and its issue, and the idea of
Progress would lapse into the idea of Providence.
As time is the very condition of the possibility of Progress, it is obvious
that the idea would be valueless if there were any cogent reasons for
supposing that the time at the disposal of humanity is likely to reach a
limit in the near future. If there were good cause for believing that the
earth would be uninhabitable in A.D. 2000 or 2100 the doctrine of
Progress would lose its meaning and would automatically disappear. It
would be a delicate question to decide what is the minimum period of
time which must be assured to man for his future development, in order
that Progress should possess value and appeal to the emotions. The
recorded history of civilisation covers 6000 years or so, and if we take
this as a measure of our conceptions of time-distances, we might
assume that if we were sure of a period ten times as long ahead of us
the idea of Progress would not lose its power of appeal. Sixty thousand
years of HISTORICAL time, when we survey the changes which have
come to pass in six thousand, opens to the imagination a range vast
enough to seem almost endless.
This psychological question, however, need not be decided. For science
assures us that the stability of the present conditions of the solar system

is certified for many myriads of years to come. Whatever gradual
modifications of climate there may be, the planet will not cease to
support life for a period which transcends and flouts all efforts of
imagination. In short, the POSSIBILITY of Progress is guaranteed by
the high probability, based on astro- physical science, of an immense
time to progress in.
It may surprise many to be told that the notion of Progress, which now
seems so easy to apprehend, is of comparatively recent origin. It has
indeed been claimed that various thinkers, both ancient (for instance,
Seneca) and medieval (for instance, Friar Bacon), had long ago
conceived it. But sporadic observations--such as man's gradual rise
from primitive and savage conditions to a certain level of civilisation
by a series of inventions, or the possibility of some future additions to
his knowledge of nature--which were inevitable at a certain stage of
human reflection, do not amount to an anticipation of the idea. The