The Great War Syndicate | Page 3

the contest, their lands might be
ravished, their people suffer.
From many quarters urgent demands were now pressed upon the
Government. From the interior there were clamours for troops to be
massed on the Northern frontier, and from the seaboard cities there
came a cry for ships that were worthy to be called men-of-war,-- ships
to defend the harbours and bays, ships to repel an invasion by sea.
Suggestions were innumerable. There was no time to build, it was
urged; the Government could call upon friendly nations. But wise men
smiled sadly at these suggestions; it was difficult to find a nation
desirous of a war with England.
In the midst of the enthusiasms, the fears, and the suggestions, came
reports of the capture of American merchantmen by fast British cruisers.
These reports made the American people more furious, the American
Government more anxious.
Almost from the beginning of this period of national turmoil, a party of

gentlemen met daily in one of the large rooms in a hotel in New York.
At first there were eleven of these men, all from the great Atlantic cities,
but their number increased by arrivals from other parts of the country,
until at last they, numbered twenty-three. These gentlemen were all
great capitalists, and accustomed to occupying themselves with great
enterprises. By day and by night they met together with closed doors,
until they had matured the scheme which they had been considering. As
soon as this work was done, a committee was sent to Washington, to
submit a plan to the Government.
These twenty-three men had formed themselves into a Syndicate, with
the object of taking entire charge of the war between the United States
and Great Britain.
This proposition was an astounding one, but the Government was
obliged to treat it with respectful consideration. The men who offered it
were a power in the land,--a power which no government could afford
to disregard.
The plan of the Syndicate was comprehensive, direct, and simple. It
offered to assume the entire control and expense of the war, and to
effect a satisfactory peace within one year. As a guarantee that this
contract would be properly performed, an immense sum of money
would be deposited in the Treasury at Washington. Should the
Syndicate be unsuccessful, this sum would be forfeited, and it would
receive no pay for anything it had done.
The sum to be paid by the Government to the Syndicate, should it bring
the war to a satisfactory conclusion, would depend upon the duration of
hostilities. That is to say, that as the shorter the duration of the war, the
greater would be the benefit to the country, therefore, the larger must
be the pay to the Syndicate. According to the proposed contract, the
Syndicate would receive, if the war should continue for a year,
one-quarter the sum stipulated to be paid if peace should be declared in
three months.
If at any time during the conduct of the war by the Syndicate an
American seaport should be taken by the enemy, or a British force

landed on any point of the seacoast, the contract should be considered
at an end, and security and payment forfeited. If any point on the
northern boundary of the United States should be taken and occupied
by the enemy, one million dollars of the deposited security should be
forfeited for every such occupation, but the contract should continue.
It was stipulated that the land and naval forces of the United States
should remain under the entire control of the Government, but should
be maintained as a defensive force, and not brought into action unless
any failure on the part of the Syndicate should render such action
necessary.
The state of feeling in governmental circles, and the evidences of alarm
and distrust which were becoming apparent in Congress and among the
people, exerted an important influence in favour of the Syndicate. The
Government caught at its proposition, not as if it were a straw, but as if
it were a life-raft. The men who offered to relieve the executive
departments of their perilous responsibilities were men of great ability,
prominent positions, and vast resources, whose vast enterprises had
already made them known all over the globe. Such men were not likely
to jeopardize their reputations and fortunes in a case like this, unless
they had well-founded reasons for believing that they would be
successful. Even the largest amount stipulated to be paid them in case
of success would be less than the ordinary estimates for the military
and naval operations which had been anticipated; and in case of failure,
the amount forfeited would go far to repair the losses which might be
sustained by the citizens of the various States.
At all events, should the Syndicate be allowed to