on the Indian frontier, which are likely to cause her considerable expense.
Then, too, there is that vast loan which she has offered to China and which is creating a sensation among the European Powers.
* * * * *
England has taken a firm position with regard to the occupation of Kiao-Chou by Germany and the seizure of Port Arthur by the Russians.
She has openly sent two war-ships to each of these ports.
This does not mean that she wishes to provoke war. It is intended probably as a hint to Germany and Russia that if they go too far she is ready to fight.
Germany, however, has repeated that Kiao-Chou is to be a free port, and this statement is being echoed with satisfaction by the English press.
Nevertheless, the English papers show an astonishingly warlike spirit, and the English people are said to be delighted by the pluck and force which Lord Salisbury has shown in this crisis.
During the past few years Lord Salisbury has been accused of a willingness to make almost any concession to avoid dragging England into a war.
* * * * *
A writer in the New York Sun has lately published a very able and interesting article on the relation of the United States to the present crisis in the East.
In this country we have been so absorbed in watching the rivalry between the European Powers over China that we have given very little thought to its effect on ourselves.
The writer in The Sun shows that it may affect us very seriously.
He does not believe that there is any immediate danger of a war as a result of the seizure of Kiao-Chou, and he adds that the present excitement may be "for the purpose of finding out just what the pretensions of the various Powers are with regard to China."
"The attitude of Great Britain," he writes, "is one requiring close examination, because of the magnitude and far-reaching character of her demands on China. Briefly stated, they are:
"First, that China shall accept a loan guaranteed by Great Britain; secondly, that as security the customs administration shall be placed under her agents, with a contingent control of the likin or internal customs; thirdly, the right to push the Burmese railways at once into Yunnan and Sechuen; and, fourthly, that no cessions of territory shall be made to any other power south of the Yang-tse-kiang."
The immense importance of these demands the writer very clearly explains.
[Illustration: WESTERN GATE, PEKIN, CHINA.]
If England were to grant China the enormous loan that she needs to pay the war indemnity to Japan, she would secure "a controlling voice in all future financial transactions which the Chinese Government might wish or be forced to undertake."
If China agreed to the second proposition, England could manage the customs in such a way as to "attract the vast bulk of the internal trade of China to herself."
He writes further:
"The third and fourth demands hang together, but have to be treated separately. The concession to Great Britain of the unrestricted right to construct railways from Burmah into the southwestern provinces of China would have the effect of turning them into commercial tributaries of Great Britain.
"A railway connecting Rangoon in Burmah by way of Bhamo with Ichang at the head of navigation on the Yang-tse-kiang would act as a suction pipe to draw away to the port of Rangoon the trade of the most prosperous and flourishing parts of China, and give products taking that route the advantage of many days in point of time and of distance in the race for the European markets. By just so much trade as might take the British route through Burmah, would the potential trade of other Powers, with no other but all sea routes from the coast at their command, be diminished.
"The advantage British manufactures would have for entry and distribution into the vast and populous regions which the British Government proposes to penetrate by means of railways constructed by British capital, and affording employment to British labor and shipping, are too obvious to need enlarging upon.
"A glance at the map will show that the better half of China proper, territorially and commercially, would, by the concession of the third and fourth of England's demands, be placed under her practical control."
The writer believes that the fourth demand is aimed at stopping the advance of the French in China beyond Tonquin.
Now comes the point of his article most interesting to us as Americans.
How are our interests in China to be affected by the European encroachments there?
They would be greatly injured, the writer points out, if any European Power were to secure such control in China that our Chinese trade would be restricted.
Consequently, our interests are on the side of China and of Japan, for the Japanese must now be looking with astonishment and alarm at the
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