The Gatlings at Santiago | Page 6

period of uncertainty, because the question of rank hinged upon some obscure and musty record of forgotten service some thirty-four years before. From these facts will be apparent the difficulty under which a subordinate labored in trying to create anything.
It is hardly worth while in any case of that sort to waste time with subordinates. The projector of an enterprise had better go straight to the one who has the necessary authority to order what is wanted; if access to him can be had, and he can be brought to recognize the merits of the plan--that settles it; if not--that also settles it. In either case the matter becomes a settled thing, and one knows what to depend upon.
But who was the man to see there at Tampa? Nobody knew.
The first officer approached was the one in direct line of superiority, Col. A. T. Smith, 13th Infantry. The idea was to ascertain his views and try to obtain from him a favorable endorsement upon a written plan to be submitted through military channels to the commanding general at Tampa. Perhaps it was the deadly climate; for the reply to a request for a few minutes' audience on the subject of machine guns was very gruff and curt: "I don't want to hear anything about it. I don't believe in it, and I don't feel like hearing it. If you want to see me about this subject, come to me in office hours." That settled it. Any effort to get a written plan through would have to carry the weight of official disapproval from the start, and even a "shavey" knows that disapproval at the start is enough to kill a paper in the official routine.
The next officers approached were Major William Auman and Capt. H. Cavanaugh, of the 13th Infantry, who were asked for advice. These two officers, both of whom rendered very distinguished services on the battle-field, listened with interest and were convinced. Their advice was: "Get your plan in tangible shape, typewritten, showing just what you propose; then go straight to the commanding general himself. If he listens to you, he will be the responsible party, and will have waived the informality; if he will not receive you, no harm is done."
This advice was followed and the following plan prepared:
_Scheme for Organization of Division Galling Gun Detachment._
"Material:
"Three guns with limbers and caissons; 28 horses and 16 saddles; 6 sets double harness, wheel, and 6 lead; 1 escort wagon, team and driver; and 100,000 rounds, .30 cal.
"Personnel:
"One first lieutenant, 3 sergeants, 3 corporals, 1 clerk, 1 cook, and 35 enlisted men selected for their intelligence, activity, and daring; volunteers, if possible to be obtained, as the service will be hazardous.
"Equipment:
"Officer: Revolver, saber, or machete, and field-glass.
"Enlisted men: Revolver and knife.
"Fifty rounds to be carried on person for revolver, and 50 in ordnance train.
"Camp Equipage:
"Four conical wall-tents, 2 'A' wall-tents, and the ordinary cooking outfit for a company of 41 men.
"Organization:
"In the discretion of the detachment commander, subject to approval of division commander; probably as follows, subject to modifications by experience:
"Three detachments under a sergeant. A detachment to be composed of 1 gunner and 7 men. The gunner should be a corporal.
"Administration:
"The Division Gatling Gun Detachment to be subject only to the orders of the division commander, or higher authority. Its members are carried on 'd. s.' in their respective organizations. Its commander exercises over it the same authority as a company commander, and keeps the same records. Returns, reports, and other business are transacted as in company, except that the detachment commander reports directly to and receives orders directly from Division Headquarters. The detachment is not subject to ordinary guard or fatigue. When used as part of a guard, whole detachments go with their pieces.
"Instruction:
"The organization is purely experimental; hence the greatest possible latitude must be allowed the detachment commander, and he should be held accountable for the results. He should not be subjected to the orders or interference of any subordinates, however able, who have made no special study of the tactical use or instruction for machine guns, and who may not have faith in the experiment. It will be useless to expect efficiency of the proposed organization unless this liberty be accorded its organizer. The field is a new one, not yet well discussed by even the text-writers. Organization and instruction must be largely experimental, subject to change as the result of experience; but no change from the plans of the organizer should be made except for good and sufficient reasons.
"Tactical Employment:
"This organization is expected to develop:
"(a) The fire-action of good infantry.
"(b) The mobility of cavalry.
"Its qualities, therefore, must be rapidity and accuracy, both of fire and movement.
"Its employment on the defensive is obvious. On the offensive it is expected to be useful with advance guards, rear