The Fight for a Free Sea | Page 5

rather painful to contemplate.
At length Hull reached Detroit and crossed the river to assume the
offensive. He was strongly hopeful of success. The Canadians appeared
friendly and several hundred sought his protection. Even the enemy's
militia were deserting to his colors. In a proclamation Hull looked
forward to a bloodless conquest, informing the Canadians that they
were to be emancipated from tyranny and oppression and restored to
the dignified station of freemen. "I have a force which will break down
all opposition," said he, "and that force is but the vanguard of a much
greater."
He soundly reasoned that unless a movement could be launched against
Niagara, at the other end of Lake Erie, the whole strength of the British
might be thrown against him and that he was likely to be trapped in
Detroit. There was a general plan of campaign, submitted by Major
General Henry Dearborn before the war began, which provided for a
threefold invasion--from Sackett's Harbor on Lake Ontario, from
Niagara, and from Detroit--in support of a grand attack along the route

leading past Lake Champlain to Montreal. Theoretically, it was good
enough strategy, but no attempt had been made to prepare the execution,
and there was no leader competent to direct it.
In response to Hull's urgent appeal, Dearborn, who was puttering about
between Boston and Albany, confessed that he knew nothing about
what was going on at Niagara. He ranked as the commander-in-chief of
the American forces and he awoke from his habitual stupor to ask
himself this amazing question: "Who is to have the command of the
operations in Upper Canada? I take it for granted that my command
does not extend to that distant quarter." If Dearborn did not know who
was in control of the operations at Niagara, it was safe to say that
nobody else did, and Hull was left to deal with the increasing forces in
front of him and the hordes of Indians in the rear, to garrison Detroit, to
assault the fort at Amherstburg, to overcome the British naval forces on
Lake Erie--and all without the slightest help or cooperation from his
Government.
Meanwhile Brock had ascertained that the American force at Niagara
consisted of a few hundred militia with no responsible officer in
command, who were making a pretense of patrolling thirty-six miles of
frontier. They were undisciplined, ragged, without tents, shoes, money,
or munitions, and ready to fall back if attacked or to go home unless
soon relieved. Having nothing to fear in that quarter, Brock gathered up
a small body of regulars as he marched and proceeded to Amherstburg
to finish the business of the unfortunate Hull.
That Hull deserves some pity as well as the disgrace which
overwhelmed him is quite apparent. Most of his troops were
ill-equipped, unreliable, and insubordinate. Even during the march to
Detroit he had to use a regular regiment to compel the obedience of
twelve hundred mutinous militiamen who refused to advance. Their
own officer could do nothing with them. At Detroit two hundred of
them refused to cross the river, on the ground that they were not
obliged to serve outside the United States. Granted such extenuation as
this, however, Hull showed himself so weak and contemptible in the
face of danger that he could not expect his fighting men to maintain

any respect for him.
His fatal flaw was lack of courage and promptitude. He did not know
how to play a poor hand well. In the emergency which confronted him
he was like a dull sword in a rusty scabbard. While the enemy waited
for reinforcements, he might have captured Amherstburg. He had the
superior force, and yet he delayed and lost heart while his regiments
dwindled because of sickness and desertion and jeered at his leadership.
The watchful Indians, led by the renowned Tecumseh, learned to
despise the Americans instead of fearing them, and were eager to take
the warpath against so easy a prey. Already other bands of braves were
hastening from Lake Huron and from Mackinac, whose American
garrison had been wiped out.
Brooding and shaken, like an old man utterly undone, Hull abandoned
his pretentious invasion of Canada and retreated across the river to
shelter his troops behind the log barricades of Detroit. He sent six
hundred men to try to open a line to Ohio, but, after a sharp encounter
with a British force, Hull was obliged to admit that they "could only
open communication as far as the points of their bayonets extended."
His only thought was to extricate himself, not to stand and fight a
winning battle without counting the cost. His officers felt only
contempt for his cowardice. They were convinced that the tide could be
turned in their favor. There were steadfast men in the ranks who