The Federalist | Page 2

parties, we shall be led to conclude that they will mutually hope to
evince the justness of their opinions, and to increase the number of
their converts by the loudness of their declamations and the bitterness
of their invectives. An enlightened zeal for the energy and efficiency of
government will be stigmatized as the offspring of a temper fond of
despotic power and hostile to the principles of liberty. An
over-scrupulous jealousy of danger to the rights of the people, which is
more commonly the fault of the head than of the heart, will be
represented as mere pretense and artifice, the stale bait for popularity at
the expense of the public good. It will be forgotten, on the one hand,
that jealousy is the usual concomitant of love, and that the noble
enthusiasm of liberty is apt to be infected with a spirit of narrow and
illiberal distrust. On the other hand, it will be equally forgotten that the
vigor of government is essential to the security of liberty; that, in the
contemplation of a sound and well-informed judgment, their interest
can never be separated; and that a dangerous ambition more often lurks
behind the specious mask of zeal for the rights of the people than under
the forbidden appearance of zeal for the firmness and efficiency of
government. History will teach us that the former has been found a

much more certain road to the introduction of despotism than the latter,
and that of those men who have overturned the liberties of republics,
the greatest number have begun their career by paying an obsequious
court to the people; commencing demagogues, and ending tyrants.
In the course of the preceding observations, I have had an eye, my
fellow-citizens, to putting you upon your guard against all attempts,
from whatever quarter, to influence your decision in a matter of the
utmost moment to your welfare, by any impressions other than those
which may result from the evidence of truth. You will, no doubt, at the
same time, have collected from the general scope of them, that they
proceed from a source not unfriendly to the new Constitution. Yes, my
countrymen, I own to you that, after having given it an attentive
consideration, I am clearly of opinion it is your interest to adopt it. I am
convinced that this is the safest course for your liberty, your dignity,
and your happiness. I affect not reserves which I do not feel. I will not
amuse you with an appearance of deliberation when I have decided. I
frankly acknowledge to you my convictions, and I will freely lay before
you the reasons on which they are founded. The consciousness of good
intentions disdains ambiguity. I shall not, however, multiply
professions on this head. My motives must remain in the depository of
my own breast. My arguments will be open to all, and may be judged
of by all. They shall at least be offered in a spirit which will not
disgrace the cause of truth.
I propose, in a series of papers, to discuss the following interesting
particulars:
THE UTILITY OF THE UNION TO YOUR POLITICAL
PROSPERITY
THE INSUFFICIENCY OF THE PRESENT CONFEDERATION TO
PRESERVE THAT UNION THE NECESSITY OF A
GOVERNMENT AT LEAST EQUALLY ENERGETIC WITH THE
ONE PROPOSED, TO THE ATTAINMENT OF THIS OBJECT THE
CONFORMITY OF THE PROPOSED CONSTITUTION TO THE
TRUE PRINCIPLES OF REPUBLICAN GOVERNMENT ITS
ANALOGY TO YOUR OWN STATE CONSTITUTION and lastly,

THE ADDITIONAL SECURITY WHICH ITS ADOPTION WILL
AFFORD TO THE PRESERVATION OF THAT SPECIES OF
GOVERNMENT, TO LIBERTY, AND TO PROPERTY.
In the progress of this discussion I shall endeavor to give a satisfactory
answer to all the objections which shall have made their appearance,
that may seem to have any claim to your attention.
It may perhaps be thought superfluous to offer arguments to prove the
utility of the UNION, a point, no doubt, deeply engraved on the hearts
of the great body of the people in every State, and one, which it may be
imagined, has no adversaries. But the fact is, that we already hear it
whispered in the private circles of those who oppose the new
Constitution, that the thirteen States are of too great extent for any
general system, and that we must of necessity resort to separate
confederacies of distinct portions of the whole.1 This doctrine will, in
all probability, be gradually propagated, till it has votaries enough to
countenance an open avowal of it. For nothing can be more evident, to
those who are able to take an enlarged view of the subject, than the
alternative of an adoption of the new Constitution or a dismemberment
of the Union. It will therefore be of use to begin by examining the
advantages of that Union, the certain evils, and the