of so much value that a
British statute of 1775 which cut off the New England fisheries was
regarded, even after the "intolerable acts" of the previous year, as the
height of punishment for New England. Many Englishmen would have
been glad to see the Americans excluded from these fisheries, but John
Adams, when he arrived from The Hague, displayed an appreciation of
New England interests and the quality of his temper as well by flatly
refusing to agree to any treaty which did not allow full fishing
privileges. The British accordingly yielded and the Americans were
granted fishing rights as "heretofore" enjoyed. The right of navigation
of the Mississippi River, it was declared in the treaty, should "forever
remain free and open" to both parties; but here Great Britain was
simply passing on to the United States a formal right which she had
received from France and was retaining for herself a similar right which
might sometime prove of use, for as long as Spain held both banks at
the mouth of the Mississippi River, the right was of little practical
value.
Two subjects involving the greatest difficulty of arrangement were the
compensation of the Loyalists and the settlement of commercial
indebtedness. The latter was really a question of the payment of British
creditors by American debtors, for there was little on the other side of
the balance sheet, and it seems as if the frugal Franklin would have
preferred to make no concessions and would have allowed creditors to
take their own chances of getting paid. But the matter appeared to
Adams in a different light--perhaps his New England conscience was
aroused--and in this point of view he was supported by Jay. It was
therefore finally agreed "that creditors on either side shall meet with no
lawful impediment to the recovery of the full value in sterling money,
of all bona fide debts heretofore contracted." However just this
provision may have been, its incorporation in the terms of the treaty
was a mistake on the part of the Commissioners, because the
Government of the United States had no power to give effect to such an
arrangement, so that the provision had no more value than an emphatic
expression of opinion. Accordingly, when some of the States later
disregarded this part of the treaty, the British had an excuse for refusing
to carry out certain of their own obligations.
The historian of the Virginia Federal Convention of 1788, H. B.
Grigsby, relates an amusing incident growing out of the controversy
over the payment of debts to creditors in England:
"A Scotchman, John Warden, a prominent lawyer and good classical
scholar, but suspected rightly of Tory leanings during the Revolution,
learning of the large minority against the repeal of laws in conflict with
the treaty of 1783 (i. e., especially the laws as to the collection of debts
by foreigners) caustically remarked that some of the members of the
House had voted against paying for the coats on their backs. The story
goes that he was summoned before the House in full session, and was
compelled to beg their pardon on his knees; but as he rose, pretending
to brush the dust from his knees, he pointed to the House and said
audibly, with evident double meaning, 'Upon my word, a dommed dirty
house it is indeed.' The Journal of the House, however, shows that the
honor of the delegates was satisfied by a written assurance from Mr.
Warden that he meant in no way to affront the dignity of the House or
to insult any of its members."
The other question, that of compensating the Loyalists for the loss of
their property, was not so simple a matter, for the whole story of the
Revolution was involved. There is a tendency among many scholars of
the present day to regard the policy of the British toward their North
American colonies as possibly unwise and blundering but as being
entirely in accordance with the legal and constitutional rights of the
mother country, and to believe that the Americans, while they may
have been practically and therefore morally justified in asserting their
independence, were still technically and legally in the wrong. It is
immaterial whether or not that point of view is accepted, for its mere
recognition is sufficient to explain the existence of a large number of
Americans who were steadfast in their support of the British side of the
controversy. Indeed, it has been estimated that as large a proportion as
one-third of the population remained loyal to the Crown. Numbers
must remain more or less uncertain, but probably the majority of the
people in the United States, whatever their feelings may have been,
tried to remain neutral or at least to appear so; and it is undoubtedly
true that the
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