The Ethics | Page 7

inasmuch as
its nature involves existence. (See Prop. vii.) But the reason for the
existence of a triangle or a circle does not follow from the nature of
those figures, but from the order of universal nature in extension. From
the latter it must follow, either that a triangle necessarily exists, or that
it is impossible that it should exist. So much is self-evident. It follows
therefrom that a thing necessarily exists, if no cause or reason be
granted which prevents its existence. If, then, no cause or reason can be
given, which prevents the existence of God, or which destroys his
existence, we must certainly conclude that he necessarily does exist. If
such a reason or cause should be given, it must either be drawn from
the very nature of God, or be external to him-that is, drawn from
another substance of another nature. For if it were of the same nature,
God, by that very fact, would be admitted to exist. But substance of
another nature could have nothing in common with God (by Prop. ii.),
and therefore would be unable either to cause or to destroy his
existence. As, then, a reason or cause which would annul the divine
existence cannot be drawn from anything external to the divine nature,
such cause must perforce, if God does not exist, be drawn from God's
own nature, which would involve a contradiction. To make such an
affirmation about a being absolutely infinite and supremely perfect is
absurd ; therefore, neither in the nature of God, nor externally to his
nature, can a cause or reason be assigned which would annul his
existence. Therefore, God necessarily exists. Q.E.D. Another
proof.-The potentiality of non-existence is a negation of power, and
contrariwise the potentiality of existence is a power, as is obvious. If,
then, that which necessarily exists is nothing but finite beings, such
finite beings are more powerful than a being absolutely infinite, which

is obviously absurd ; therefore, either nothing exists, or else a being
absolutely infinite necessarily exists also. Now we exist either in
ourselves, or in something else which necessarily exists (see Axiom. i.
and Prop. vii.). Therefore a being absolutely infinite-in other words,
God (Def. vi.)-necessarily exists. Q.E.D. Note.-In this last proof, I have
purposely shown God's existence à posteriori, so that the proof might
be more easily followed, not because, from the same premises, God's
existence does not follow à priori. For, as the potentiality of existence
is a power, it follows that, in proportion as reality increases in the
nature of a thing, so also will it increase its strength for existence.
Therefore a being absolutely infinite, such as God, has from himself an
absolutely infinite power of existence, and hence he does absolutely
exist. Perhaps there will be many who will be unable to see the force of
this proof, inasmuch as they are accustomed only to consider those
things which flow from external causes. Of such things, they see that
those which quickly come to pass-that is, quickly come into
existence-quickly also disappear ; whereas they regard as more difficult
of accomplishment-that is, not so easily brought into existence-those
things which they conceive as more complicated. However, to do away
with this misconception, I need not here show the measure of truth in
the proverb, "What comes quickly, goes quickly," nor discuss whether,
from the point of view of universal nature, all things are equally easy,
or otherwise : I need only remark that I am not here speaking of things,
which come to pass through causes external to themselves, but only of
substances which (by Prop. vi.) cannot be produced by any external
cause. Things which are produced by external causes, whether they
consist of many parts or few, owe whatsoever perfection or reality they
possess solely to the efficacy of their external cause ; and therefore
their existence arises solely from the perfection of their external cause,
not from their own. Contrrariwise, whatsoever perfection is possessed
by substance is due to no external cause ; wherefore the existence of
substance must arise solely from its own nature, which is nothing else
but its essence. Thus, the perfection of a thing does not annul its
existence, but, on the contrary, asserts it. Imperfection, on the other
hand, does annul it ; therefore we cannot be more certain of the
existence of anything, than of the existence of a being absolutely
infinite or perfect-that is, of God. For inasmuch as his essence excludes

all imperfection, and involves absolute perfection, all cause for doubt
concerning his existence is done away, and the utmost certainty on the
question is given. This, I think, will be evident to every moderately
attentive reader.
PROP. XII. No attribute of substance can be conceived from which it
would follow that substance