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The Ethics (Ethica Ordine Geometrico Demonstrata)
by Benedict de Spinoza

Translated from the Latin by R. H. M. Elwes


PART I. CONCERNING GOD.
DEFINITIONS.
I. By that which is self-caused, I mean that of which the essence
involves existence, or that of which the nature is only conceivable as
existent.
II. A thing is called finite after its kind, when it can be limited by

another thing of the same nature ; for instance, a body is called finite
because we always conceive another greater body. So, also, a thought is
limited by another thought, but a body is not limited by thought, nor a
thought by body.
III. By substance, I mean that which is in itself, and is conceived
through itself : in other words, that of which a conception can be
formed independently of any other conception.
IV. By attribute, I mean that which the intellect perceives as
constituting the essence of substance.
V. By mode, I mean the modifications1 of substance, or that which
exists in, and is conceived through, something other than itself.
VI. By God, I mean a being absolutely infinite-that is, a substance
consisting in infinite attributes, of which each expresses eternal and
infinite essentiality. Explanation-I say absolutely infinite, not infinite
after its kind : for, of a thing infinite only after its kind, infinite
attributes may be denied ; but that which is absolutely infinite, contains
in its essence whatever expresses reality, and involves no negation.
VII. That thing is called free, which exists solely by the necessity of its
own nature, and of which the action is determined by itself alone. On
the other hand, that thing is necessary, or rather constrained, which is
determined by something external to itself to a fixed and definite
method of existence or action.
VIII. By eternity, I mean existence itself, in so far as it is conceived
necessarily to follow solely from the definition of that which is eternal.
Explanation-Existence of this kind is conceived as an eternal truth, like
the essence of a thing, and, therefore, cannot be explained by means of
continuance or time, though continuance may be conceived without a
beginning or end.
AXIOMS.
I. Everything which exists, exists either in itself or in something else.

II. That which cannot be conceived through anything else must be
conceived through itself.
III. From a given definite cause an effect necessarily follows ; and, on
the other hand, if no definite cause be granted, it is impossible that an
effect can follow.
IV. The knowledge of an effect depends on and involves the knowledge
of a cause.
V. Things which have nothing in common cannot be understood, the
one by means of the other ; the conception of one does not involve the
conception of the other.
VI. A true idea must correspond with its ideate or object.
VII. If a thing can be conceived as non-existing, its essence does not
involve existence.
PROPOSITIONS.
PROP. I. Substance is by nature prior to its modifications. Proof.-This
is clear from Deff. iii. and v.
PROP. II. Two substances, whose attributes are different, have nothing
in common. Proof.-Also evident from Def. iii. For each must exist in
itself, and be conceived through itself ; in other words, the conception
of one does not imply the conception of the other.
PROP. III. Things which have nothing in common cannot be one the
cause of the other. Proof.-If they have nothing in common, it follows
that one cannot be apprehended by means of the other (Ax. v.), and,
therefore, one cannot be the cause of the other (Ax. iv.). Q.E.D.
PROP. IV. Two or more distinct things are distinguished one from the
other, either by the difference of the attributes of the substances, or by
the difference of their modifications. Proof.-Everything which exists,
exists either in itself or in something else (Ax. i.),-that is (by Deff. iii.

and v.), nothing is granted in addition to the understanding, except
substance and its modifications. Nothing is, therefore, given besides the
understanding, by which several things may be distinguished one from
the other, except the substances, or, in other words (see Ax. iv.), their
attributes and modifications. Q.E.D.
PROP. V. There cannot exist in the universe two or more substances
having the same nature or attribute. Proof.-If several distinct substances
be granted, they must be distinguished one from the other, either by the
difference of their attributes, or by the difference of their modifications
(Prop. iv.). If only by the difference of their attributes, it will be granted
that there cannot be more than one with an identical attribute. If by the
difference of their modifications-as substance is naturally prior to its
modifications (Prop.