The Essays, vol 3 | Page 7

notice of the controversies of rights and wrongs, the
establishment of laws and civil government, and the like; if divines, the
affairs of the Church, ecclesiastical censures, marriages, and
dispensations; if courtiers, manners and ceremonies; if soldiers, the
things that properly belong to their trade, and, principally, the accounts
of the actions and enterprises wherein they were personally engaged; if
ambassadors, we are to observe negotiations, intelligences, and
practices, and the manner how they are to be carried on.
And this is the reason why (which perhaps I should have lightly passed
over in another) I dwelt upon and maturely considered one passage in
the history written by Monsieur de Langey, a man of very great
judgment in things of that nature: after having given a narrative of the
fine oration Charles V. had made in the Consistory at Rome, and in the
presence of the Bishop of Macon and Monsieur du Velly, our

ambassadors there, wherein he had mixed several injurious expressions
to the dishonour of our nation; and amongst the rest, "that if his
captains and soldiers were not men of another kind of fidelity,
resolution, and sufficiency in the knowledge of arms than those of the
King, he would immediately go with a rope about his neck and sue to
him for mercy" (and it should seem the Emperor had really this, or a
very little better opinion of our military men, for he afterwards, twice
or thrice in his life, said the very same thing); as also, that he
challenged the King to fight him in his shirt with rapier and poignard in
a boat. The said Sieur de Langey, pursuing his history, adds that the
forenamed ambassadors, sending a despatch to the King of these things,
concealed the greatest part, and particularly the last two passages. At
which I could not but wonder that it should be in the power of an
ambassador to dispense with anything which he ought to signify to his
master, especially of so great importance as this, coming from the
mouth of such a person, and spoken in so great an assembly; and I
should rather conceive it had been the servant's duty faithfully to have
represented to him the whole thing as it passed, to the end that the
liberty of selecting, disposing, judging, and concluding might have
remained in him: for either to conceal or to disguise the truth for fear he
should take it otherwise than he ought to do, and lest it should prompt
him to some extravagant resolution, and, in the meantime, to leave him
ignorant of his affairs, should seem, methinks, rather to belong to him
who is to give the law than to him who is only to receive it; to him who
is in supreme command, and not to him who ought to look upon
himself as inferior, not only in authority, but also in prudence and good
counsel. I, for my part, would not be so served in my little concerns.
We so willingly slip the collar of command upon any pretence
whatever, and are so ready to usurp upon dominion, every one does so
naturally aspire to liberty and power, that no utility whatever derived
from the wit or valour of those he employs ought to be so dear to a
superior as a downright and sincere obedience. To obey more upon the
account of understanding than of subjection, is to corrupt the office of
command-- [Taken from Aulus Gellius, i. 13.]--; insomuch that P.
Crassus, the same whom the Romans reputed five times happy, at the
time when he was consul in Asia, having sent to a Greek engineer to

cause the greater of two masts of ships that he had taken notice of at
Athens to be brought to him, to be employed about some engine of
battery he had a design to make; the other, presuming upon his own
science and sufficiency in those affairs, thought fit to do otherwise than
directed, and to bring the less, which, according to the rules of art, was
really more proper for the use to which it was designed; but Crassus,
though he gave ear to his reasons with great patience, would not,
however, take them, how sound or convincing soever, for current pay,
but caused him to be well whipped for his pains, valuing the interest of
discipline much more than that of the work in hand.
Notwithstanding, we may on the other side consider that so precise and
implicit an obedience as this is only due to positive and limited
commands. The employment of ambassadors is never so confined,
many things in their management of affairs being wholly referred to the
absolute sovereignty of their own conduct; they do not simply execute,
but also, to their own discretion and wisdom,