The Discovery of a World in the Moone | Page 6

John Wilkins
removed without a great deale of preparation, and I could not tell otherwise how to rectifie the thoughts of the Reader for an impartiall survey of the following discourse.
I must needs confesse, though I had often thought with my selfe that it was possible there might be a world in the Moone, yet it seemed such an uncouth opinion that I never durst discover it, for feare of being counted singular and ridiculous, but afterward having read Plutarch, Galil?us, Keplar, with some others, and finding many of mine owne thoughts confirmed by such strong authority, I then concluded that it was not onely possible there might bee, but probable that there was another habitable world in that Planet. In the prosecuting of this assertion, I shall first endeavour to cleare the way from such doubts as may hinder the speed or ease of farther progresse; and because the suppositions imply'd in this opinion may seeme to contradict the principles of reason or faith, it will be requisite that I first remove this scruple, shewing the conformity of them to both these, and proving those truths that may make way for the rest, which I shall labour to performe in the second, third, fourth, and fifth Chapters, and then proceede to confirme such Propositions, which doe more directly belong to the maine point in hand.

Proposition 2.
That a plurality of worlds doth not contradict any principle of reason or faith.
Tis reported of Aristotle that when hee saw the bookes of Moses he commended them for such a majesticke stile as might become a God, but withall hee censured that manner of writing to be very unfitting for a Philosopher because there was nothing proved in them, but matters were delivered as if they would rather command than perswade beliefe. And 'tis observed that hee sets downe nothing himselfe, but he confirmes it by the strongest reasons that may be found, there being scarce an argument of force for any subject in Philosophy which may not bee picked out of his writings, and therefore 'tis likely if there were in reason a necessity of one onely world, that hee would have found out some such necessary proofe as might confirme it: Especially since hee labours for it so much in two whole Chapters. But now all the arguments which he himselfe urges in this subject,[1] are very weake and farre enough from having in them any convincing power. Therefore 'tis likely that a plurality of worlds doth not contradict any principle of reason. However, I will set downe the two chiefe of his arguments from his owne workes, and from them you may guesse the force of the other. The 1. is this,[2] since every heavy body doth naturally tend downwards, and every light body upwards, what a hudling and confusion must there bee if there were two places for gravity and two places for lightnesse: for it is probable that the Earth of that other World would fall downe to this Center, and so mutually the aire and fire here ascend to those Regions in the other, which must needes much derogate from the providence of nature, and cause a great disorder in his workes. To this I answere, that if you will consider the nature of gravity, you will plainely see there is no ground to feare any such confusion, for heavinesse is nothing else but such a quality as causes a propension in 'its subject to tend downewards towards its owne Centre, so that for some of that earth to come hither would not bee said a fall but an ascension, since it moved from its owne place, and this would bee impossible (saith Ruvio) because against nature,[3] and therefore no more to bee feared than the falling of the Heavens.
[Sidenote 1: De Coelo l. 1. c. 8. 9.]
[Sidenote 2: Ibid.]
[Sidenote 3: De Coelo l. 1. c. 9. q. 1.]
Another Argument hee had from his master Plato,[1] that there is but one World, because there is but one first mover, God.[2]
[Sidenote 1: Metaphys. l. 12. c. 8.]
[Sidenote 2: Diog. Laert. lib. 3.]
But here I may deny the consequence, since a plurality of worlds doth not take away the unity of the first mover.
Vt enim forma substantialis, sic primum efficiens apparentem solummodo multiplicitatem induit per signatam materiam
(saith a Countreyman of ours.)[1] As the substantiall forme, so the efficient cause hath onely an appearing multiplicity from its particular matter. You may see this point more largely handled, and these Arguments more fully answered by Plutarch in his Booke (why Oracles are silent) and Iacob Carpentarius in his comment on Alcinous.
[Sidenote 1: Nic. Hill. de Philosop. Epic. partic. 379.]
But our opposites the Interpreters themselves, (who too often doe jurare in verba magistri) will grant that there is not any strength in these consequences,
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