The Critique of Pure Reason | Page 2

which rest upon a secure foundation, such as mathematics,
physical science, etc., in the least deserve this reproach, but that they
rather maintain their ancient fame, and in the latter case, indeed, far
surpass it. The same would be the case with the other kinds of
cognition, if their principles were but firmly established. In the absence
of this security, indifference, doubt, and finally, severe criticism are
rather signs of a profound habit of thought. Our age is the age of
criticism, to which everything must be subjected. The sacredness of
religion, and the authority of legislation, are by many regarded as
grounds of exemption from the examination of this tribunal. But, if
they on they are exempted, they become the subjects of just suspicion,
and cannot lay claim to sincere respect, which reason accords only to
that which has stood the test of a free and public examination.]
I do not mean by this a criticism of books and systems, but a critical
inquiry into the faculty of reason, with reference to the cognitions to
which it strives to attain without the aid of experience; in other words,
the solution of the question regarding the possibility or impossibility of
metaphysics, and the determination of the origin, as well as of the
extent and limits of this science. All this must be done on the basis of
principles.
This path--the only one now remaining--has been entered upon by me;

and I flatter myself that I have, in this way, discovered the cause
of--and consequently the mode of removing--all the errors which have
hitherto set reason at variance with itself, in the sphere of non-empirical
thought. I have not returned an evasive answer to the questions of
reason, by alleging the inability and limitation of the faculties of the
mind; I have, on the contrary, examined them completely in the light of
principles, and, after having discovered the cause of the doubts and
contradictions into which reason fell, have solved them to its perfect
satisfaction. It is true, these questions have not been solved as
dogmatism, in its vain fancies and desires, had expected; for it can only
be satisfied by the exercise of magical arts, and of these I have no
knowledge. But neither do these come within the compass of our
mental powers; and it was the duty of philosophy to destroy the
illusions which had their origin in misconceptions, whatever darling
hopes and valued expectations may be ruined by its explanations. My
chief aim in this work has been thoroughness; and I make bold to say
that there is not a single metaphysical problem that does not find its
solution, or at least the key to its solution, here. Pure reason is a perfect
unity; and therefore, if the principle presented by it prove to be
insufficient for the solution of even a single one of those questions to
which the very nature of reason gives birth, we must reject it, as we
could not be perfectly certain of its sufficiency in the case of the others.
While I say this, I think I see upon the countenance of the reader signs
of dissatisfaction mingled with contempt, when he hears declarations
which sound so boastful and extravagant; and yet they are beyond
comparison more moderate than those advanced by the commonest
author of the commonest philosophical programme, in which the
dogmatist professes to demonstrate the simple nature of the soul, or the
necessity of a primal being. Such a dogmatist promises to extend
human knowledge beyond the limits of possible experience; while I
humbly confess that this is completely beyond my power. Instead of
any such attempt, I confine myself to the examination of reason alone
and its pure thought; and I do not need to seek far for the sum-total of
its cognition, because it has its seat in my own mind. Besides, common
logic presents me with a complete and systematic catalogue of all the
simple operations of reason; and it is my task to answer the question

how far reason can go, without the material presented and the aid
furnished by experience.
So much for the completeness and thoroughness necessary in the
execution of the present task. The aims set before us are not arbitrarily
proposed, but are imposed upon us by the nature of cognition itself.
The above remarks relate to the matter of our critical inquiry. As
regards the form, there are two indispensable conditions, which any one
who undertakes so difficult a task as that of a critique of pure reason, is
bound to fulfil. These conditions are certitude and clearness.
As regards certitude, I have fully convinced myself that, in this sphere
of thought, opinion is perfectly inadmissible, and that everything which
bears the least semblance of an hypothesis must be excluded, as