The Crime Against Europe | Page 5

Germany has had it in her power,
again and again within the last thirty years to attack France at a
disadvantage, if not even with impunity. Why has she refrained--whose
hand restrained her? Not Russia's--not England's. During the
Russo-Japanese war or during the Boer war, France could have been
assailed with ease and her army broken to pieces. But German
militarism refrained from striking that blow. The object of the great
army France maintains is not to be found in reasons of self-defence, but
may be found, like that of Russia in hopes of armed expansion. Since
the aim in both cases was the same, to wage a war of aggression to be
termed of "recovery" in one case and "protection" in the other, it was
not surprising that Czar and President should come together, and that
the cause of the Slavs should become identified with the cause of
Strasburg.
To "protect" the Slavs meant assailing Austria-Hungary (another way
of attacking Germany), and to "recover" Strasburg meant a
mes-alliance between democrat of France and Cossack of the Don.
We come now to the third party to die Entente, and it is now we begin
to perceive how it was that a cordial understanding with England
rendered a Russo-French attack upon Germany only a question of time
and opportunity. Until England appeared upon the scene neither Russia
nor France, nor both combined, could summon up courage to strike the
blow. Willing to wound they were both afraid to strike. It needed a
third courage, a keener purpose and a greater immunity.
German militarism was too formidable a factor in the life of 65,000,000
of the most capable people in Europe to be lightly assailed even by
France and Russia combined. Russia needed money to perfect the
machinery of invasion, so sorely tried by the disastrous failure to
invade Korea and Manchuria. France had the money to advance, but
she still doubted the ability of her stagnant population of 40,000,000 to
face the growing magnitude of the great people across the Rhine. It
needed another guarantee--and England brought it.
From the day that Great Britain and her mighty fleet joined the
separated allies with their mighty armies, the bond between them and

the circle round Germany grew taut. From that day the counsels of the
allies and their new found "friend" thickened and quickened. The
immovable "menace across the Rhine" in one case had become the
active "menace across the North Sea" in the other case.
The sin of German militarism was at last out. It could take to the water
as kindly as to the land. As long as the war machine guaranteed the
inviolability of German territory it was no threat to European peace, but
when it assumed the task of safe-guarding German rights at sea it
became the enemy of civilization. These trading people not content
with an army that kept French "revanche" discreetly silent and Slav
"unity" a dream of the future presumed to have a sea-born commerce
that grew by leaps and bounds, and they dared to build a navy to defend
and even to extend it. Delenda est Carthago! From that day the doom
of "German militarism" was sealed; and England, democratic England,
lay down with the Czar in the same bed to which the French housewife
had already transferred her republican counterpane.
The duration of peace became only a question of time, and the war of
to-day only a question of opportunity and pretext. Each of the parties to
the understanding had the same clear purpose to serve, and while the
aim to each was different the end was the same. Germany's power of
defence must be destroyed. That done each of the sleeping partners to
the unsigned compact would get the share of the spoils, guarded by
armed German manhood, he coveted.
To Russia, the dismemberment of Austria-Hungary and the
incorporation of the Slav elements in part into her own vast empire, in
part into a vassal and subordinate Balkan Confederacy.
To France the restoration of Lorraine, with Metz, and of Alsace with
Strasburg and their 1,500,000 of German speaking Teutons to the
French Empire.
To England, the destruction of German sea-power and along with it the
permanent crippling of German competition in the markets of the
world.

Incidentally German colonies would disappear along with German
shipping, and with both gone a German navy would become a useless
burden for a nation of philosophers to maintain, so that the future status
of maritime efficiency in Europe could be left to the power that polices
the seas to equitably fix for all mankind, as well as for the defeated
rival.
Such an outline was the altruistic scope of the unsigned agreement
entered into by the three parties of the Triple Entente; and it only
remained to get