The Communist Threat in the Taiwan Area | Page 4

Also, we have more to guide us than the teachings of history. We have
the statements, the boastings, of the Chinese Communists themselves.
They frankly say that their present military effort is part of a program to

conquer Formosa.
It is as certain as can be that the shooting which the Chinese
Communists started on August 23d had as its purpose not just the
taking of the island of Quemoy. It is part of what is indeed an
ambitious plan of armed conquest.
This plan would liquidate all of the free-world positions in the western
Pacific area and bring them under captive governments which would be
hostile to the United States and the free world. Thus the Chinese and
Russian Communists would come to dominate at least the western half
of the now friendly Pacific Ocean.
So aggression by ruthless despots again imposes a clear danger to the
United States and to the free world.
In this effort the Chinese Communists and the Soviet Union appear to
be working hand in hand. Last Monday I received a long letter on this
subject from Prime Minister Khrushchev. He warned the United States
against helping its allies in the western Pacific. He said that we should
not support the Republic of China and the Republic of Korea. He
contended that we should desert them, return all of our naval forces to
our home bases, and leave our friends in the Far East to face, alone, the
combined military power of the Soviet Union and Communist China.
Does Mr. Khrushchev think that we have so soon forgotten Korea?
I must say to you very frankly and soberly, my friends, the United
States cannot accept the result that the Communists seek. Neither can
we show, now, a weakness of purpose--a timidity--which would surely
lead them to move more aggressively against us and our friends in the
western Pacific area.
If the Chinese Communists have decided to risk a war, it is not because
Quemoy itself is so valuable to them. They have been getting along
without Quemoy ever since they seized the China mainland 9 years
ago.
If they have now decided to risk a war, it can only be because they, and
their Soviet allies, have decided to find out whether threatening war is a
policy from which they can make big gains.
If that is their decision, then a western Pacific Munich would not buy
us peace or security. It would encourage the aggressors. It would
dismay our friends and allies there. If history teaches anything,
appeasement would make it more likely that we would have to fight a

major war.
Congress has made clear its recognition that the security of the western
Pacific is vital to the security of the United States and that we should be
firm. The Senate has ratified, by overwhelming vote, security treaties
with the Republic of China covering Formosa and the Pescadores, and
also the Republic of Korea. We have a mutual security treaty with the
Republic of the Philippines, which could be next in line for conquest if
Formosa fell into hostile hands. These treaties commit the United
States to the defense of the treaty areas. In addition, there is a joint
resolution which the Congress passed in January 1955 dealing
specifically with Formosa and the offshore islands of Free China in the
Formosa Straits.
At that time the situation was similar to what it is today.
Congress then voted the President authority to employ the Armed
Forces of the United States for the defense not only of Formosa but of
related positions, such as Quemoy and Matsu, if I believed their
defense to be appropriate in assuring the defense of Formosa.
I might add that the mandate from the Congress was given by an almost
unanimous bipartisan vote.
Today, the Chinese Communists announce, repeatedly and officially,
that their military operations against Quemoy are preliminary to attack
on Formosa. So it is clear that the Formosa Straits resolution of 1955
applies to the present situation.
If the present bombardment and harassment of Quemoy should be
converted into a major assault, with which the local defenders could not
cope, then we would be compelled to face precisely the situation that
Congress visualized in 1955.
I have repeatedly sought to make clear our position in this matter so
that there would not be danger of Communist miscalculation. The
Secretary of State on September 4th made a statement to the same end.
This statement could not, of course, cover every contingency. Indeed, I
interpret the joint resolution as requiring me not to make absolute
advance commitments but to use my judgment according to the
circumstances of the time. But the statement did carry a clear meaning
to the Chinese Communists and to the Soviet Union. There will be no
retreat