The Coming Conquest of England | Page 6

on the other hand, which God forbid! the
fortune of war should turn against us, we should always find a line of
retreat to Turkestan open and be able to renew the attack at pleasure. If
the English army is defeated, then India is lost to Great Britain; for the
English are, in India, in the enemy's country; as a defeated people they
will find no support in the Indian people. They would be attacked on all
sides by the Indian native chieftains, whose independence they have so

brutally destroyed, at the very moment that their power is broken. We,
on the other hand, should be received with open arms, as rescuers of the
Indian people from their intolerable yoke. The Anglo-Indian army
looks on paper much more formidable than it really is; its strength is
put at 200,000 men, yet only one-third of this number are English
soldiers, the rest being composed of natives. This army, moreover,
consists of four divisions, which are scattered over the whole great
territory of India. A field army, for employment on the frontier or
across it, cannot possibly consist of more than 60,000 men; for,
considering the untrustworthiness of the population, the land cannot be
denuded of its garrisons. As a result of what I have said, I record my
conviction that the war will have to be waged in India itself, and that
God will give us the victory."
The words of the General, spoken in an energetic and confident tone,
made a deep impression upon his hearers; only respect for the presence
of the Grand Dukes prevented applause. The greyhaired President gave
the Minister of War his hand, and invited the Minister for Foreign
Affairs to address them.
"In my opinion," said the diplomatist, "there is no doubt that the
strategical opinions just delivered by His Excellency the Minister for
War are based upon an expert's sound and correct estimate of the
circumstances, and I also am certain that the troops of His Majesty the
Tsar, accustomed as they are to victory, will, in the event of war, soon
be standing upon the plain of the Indus. It is also my firm conviction
that Russia would be best advised to take the offensive as soon as ever
the impossibility of our present relations to England has been
demonstrated. But whoever goes to war with England must not look to
one battleground alone. On the contrary, we must be prepared for
attacks of the most varied kinds, for an attack upon our finances, to
begin with, and upon our credit, as to which His Excellency Witte
could give better information than I could. The Bank of England, and
the great banking firms allied with it, would at once open this financial
campaign. Moreover, a ship sailing under the Russian flag would
hardly dare show itself on the open seas, and our international trade
would, until our enemy had been crushed, be absolutely at a standstill.
Moreover, more vital for us than considerations of this sort would be
the question: What of the attitude of the other great Powers? England's

political art has, since the days of Oliver Cromwell, displayed itself
chiefly in adroitly making use of the continental Powers. It is no
exaggeration to say that England's wars have been chiefly waged with
continental armies. This is not said in depreciation of England's
military powers. Wherever the English fleet and English armies have
been seen on the field of battle, the energy, endurance, and intrepidity
of their officers, sailors, and soldiers have ever been brilliantly
noticeable. The traditions of the English troops who, under the Black
Prince and Henry V., marched in days of yore victorious through
France, were again green in the wars in the eighteenth century against
France and against Napoleon. Yet infinitely greater than her own
military record has been England's success in persuading foreign
countries to fight for her, and in leading the troops of Austria, France,
Germany, and Russia against each other on the Continent. For the last
two hundred years very few wars have ever been waged without
England's co-operation, and without her reaping the advantage. These
few exceptions were the wars of Bismarck, waged for the advantage
and for the glory of his own country, by which he earned the hatred of
every good Englishman. While the continent of Europe was racked by
internal wars, which English diplomacy had incited, Great Britain
acquired her vast colonial possessions. England has implicated us too
in wars which redounded to her sole advantage. I need only refer to the
bloody, exhausting war of 1877-8, and to the disastrous peace of San
Stefano, where England's intrigues deprived us of the price of our
victory over the Crescent. I refer, further, to the Crimean War, in which
a small English and a