The Collected Works of Ambrose Bierce | Page 6

and
inheritance, yet reaps no profit from the victory. Sad to look upon: in
the highest stage of civilization nine-tenths of mankind have to struggle
in the lowest battle of savage or even animal man--the battle against
famine. Countries are rich, prosperous in all manner of increase,
beyond example; but the men of these countries are poor, needier than
ever of all sustenance, outward and inward; of belief, of knowledge, of
money, of food."
To this somber picture of American "prosperity" in the nineteenth
century nothing of worth can be added by the most inspired artist. Let
us simply inscribe upon the gloomy canvas the memorable words of an
illustrious poet of the period:
That country speeds to an untoward fate, Where men are trivial and
gold is great.
One of the most "sacred" rights of the ancient American was the trial of
an accused person by "a jury of his peers." This, in America, was a
right secured to him by a written constitution. It was almost universally

believed to have had its origin in Magna Carta, a famous document
which certain rebellious noblemen of another country had compelled
their sovereign to sign under a threat of death. That celebrated "bill of
rights" has not all come down to us, but researches of the learned have
made it certain that it contained no mention of trial by jury, which,
indeed, was unknown to its authors. The words judicium parium meant
to them something entirely different--the judgment of the entire
community of freemen. The words and the practice they represented
antedated Magna Carta by many centuries and were common to the
Franks and other Germanic nations, amongst whom a trial "jury"
consisted of persons having a knowledge of the matter to be
determined--persons who in later times were called "witnesses" and
rigorously excluded from the seats of judgment.
It is difficult to conceive a more clumsy and ineffective machinery for
ascertaining truth and doing justice than a jury of twelve men of the
average intelligence, even among ourselves. What, then, must this
device have been among the half-civilized tribes of the Connected
States of America! Nay, the case is worse than that, for it was the
practice to prevent men of even the average intelligence from serving
as jurors. Jurors had to be residents of the locality of the crime charged,
and every crime was made a matter of public notoriety long before the
accused was brought to trial; yet, as a rule, he who had read or talked
about the trial was held disqualified to serve. This in a country where,
when a man who could read was not reading about local crimes he was
talking about them, or if doing neither was doing something worse!
To the twelve men so chosen the opposing lawyers addressed their
disingenuous pleas and for their consideration the witnesses presented
their carefully rehearsed testimony, most of it false. So unintelligent
were these juries that a great part of the time in every trial was
consumed in keeping from them certain kinds of evidence with which
they could not be trusted; yet the lawyers were permitted to submit to
them any kind of misleading argument that they pleased and fortify it
with innuendoes without relevancy and logic without sense. Appeals to
their passions, their sympathies, their prejudices, were regarded as
legitimate influences and tolerated by the judges on the theory that each
side's offenses would about offset those of the other. In a criminal case
it was expected that the prosecutor would declare repeatedly and in the

most solemn manner his belief in the guilt of the person accused, and
that the attorney for the defense would affirm with equal gravity his
conviction of his client's innocence. How could they impress the jury
with a belief which they did not themselves venture to affirm? It is not
recorded that any lawyer ever rebelled against the iron authority of
these conditions and stood for truth and conscience. They were, indeed,
the conditions of his existence as a lawyer, a fact which they easily
persuaded themselves mitigated the baseness of their obedience to them,
or justified it altogether.
The judges, as a rule, were no better, for before they could become
judges they must have been advocates, with an advocate's fatal
disabilities of judgment. Most of them depended for their office upon
the favor of the people, which, also, was fatal to the independence, the
dignity and the impartiality to which they laid so solemn claim. In their
decisions they favored, so far as they dared, every interest, class or
person powerful enough to help or hurt them in an election. Holding
their high office by so precarious a tenure, they were under strong
temptation to enrich themselves from the serviceable purses of wealthy
litigants, and in disregard