The Categories | Page 9

contrary to themselves. For it
happens at times that the same thing is both small and great. For the
same thing may be small in comparison with one thing, and great in
comparison with another, so that the same thing comes to be both small
and great at one and the same time, and is of such a nature as to admit
contrary qualities at one and the same moment. Yet it was agreed, when
substance was being discussed, that nothing admits contrary qualities at
one and the same moment. For though substance is capable of
admitting contrary qualities, yet no one is at the same time both sick
and healthy, nothing is at the same time both white and black. Nor is
there anything which is qualified in contrary ways at one and the same
time.

Moreover, if these were contraries, they would themselves be contrary
to themselves. For if 'great' is the contrary of 'small', and the same thing
is both great and small at the same time, then 'small' or 'great' is the
contrary of itself. But this is impossible. The term 'great', therefore, is
not the contrary of the term 'small', nor 'much' of 'little'. And even
though a man should call these terms not relative but quantitative, they
would not have contraries.
It is in the case of space that quantity most plausibly appears to admit
of a contrary. For men define the term 'above' as the contrary of 'below',
when it is the region at the centre they mean by 'below'; and this is so,
because nothing is farther from the extremities of the universe than the
region at the centre. Indeed, it seems that in defining contraries of every
kind men have recourse to a spatial metaphor, for they say that those
things are contraries which, within the same class, are separated by the
greatest possible distance.
Quantity does not, it appears, admit of variation of degree. One thing
cannot be two cubits long in a greater degree than another. Similarly
with regard to number: what is 'three' is not more truly three than what
is 'five' is five; nor is one set of three more truly three than another set.
Again, one period of time is not said to be more truly time than another.
Nor is there any other kind of quantity, of all that have been mentioned,
with regard to which variation of degree can be predicated. The
category of quantity, therefore, does not admit of variation of degree.
The most distinctive mark of quantity is that equality and inequality are
predicated of it. Each of the aforesaid quantities is said to be equal or
unequal. For instance, one solid is said to be equal or unequal to
another; number, too, and time can have these terms applied to them,
indeed can all those kinds of quantity that have been mentioned.
That which is not a quantity can by no means, it would seem, be termed
equal or unequal to anything else. One particular disposition or one
particular quality, such as whiteness, is by no means compared with
another in terms of equality and inequality but rather in terms of
similarity. Thus it is the distinctive mark of quantity that it can be
called equal and unequal.

Section 2
Part 7
Those things are called relative, which, being either said to be of
something else or related to something else, are explained by reference
to that other thing. For instance, the word 'superior' is explained by
reference to something else, for it is superiority over something else
that is meant. Similarly, the expression 'double' has this external
reference, for it is the double of something else that is meant. So it is
with everything else of this kind. There are, moreover, other relatives,
e.g. habit, disposition, perception, knowledge, and attitude. The
significance of all these is explained by a reference to something else
and in no other way. Thus, a habit is a habit of something, knowledge
is knowledge of something, attitude is the attitude of something. So it is
with all other relatives that have been mentioned. Those terms, then,
are called relative, the nature of which is explained by reference to
something else, the preposition 'of' or some other preposition being
used to indicate the relation. Thus, one mountain is called great in
comparison with son with another; for the mountain claims this
attribute by comparison with something. Again, that which is called
similar must be similar to something else, and all other such attributes
have this external reference. It is to be noted that lying and standing
and sitting are particular attitudes, but attitude is itself a relative term.
To lie, to stand, to be seated, are not themselves attitudes, but take their
name from the aforesaid attitudes.
It