The Categories | Page 3

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ETEXTS*Ver.04.29.93*END*
The Categories
By Aristotle
Translated by E. M. Edghill
Section 1
Part 1
Things are said to be named 'equivocally' when, though they have a
common name, the definition corresponding with the name differs for
each. Thus, a real man and a figure in a picture can both lay claim to
the name 'animal'; yet these are equivocally so named, for, though they
have a common name, the definition corresponding with the name
differs for each. For should any one define in what sense each is an
animal, his definition in the one case will be appropriate to that case
only.
On the other hand, things are said to be named 'univocally' which have
both the name and the definition answering to the name in common. A
man and an ox are both 'animal', and these are univocally so named,
inasmuch as not only the name, but also the definition, is the same in
both cases: for if a man should state in what sense each is an animal,
the statement in the one case would be identical with that in the other.
Things are said to be named 'derivatively', which derive their name
from some other name, but differ from it in termination. Thus the
grammarian derives his name from the word 'grammar', and the
courageous man from the word 'courage'.
Part 2
Forms of speech are either simple or composite. Examples of the latter
are such expressions as 'the man runs', 'the man wins'; of the former
'man', 'ox', 'runs', 'wins'.

Of things themselves some are predicable of a subject, and are never
present in a subject. Thus 'man' is predicable of the individual man, and
is never present in a subject.
By being 'present in a subject' I do not mean present as parts are present
in a whole, but being incapable of existence apart from the said subject.
Some things, again, are present in a subject, but are never predicable of
a subject. For instance, a certain point of grammatical knowledge is
present in the mind, but is not predicable of any subject; or again, a
certain whiteness may be present in the body (for colour requires a
material basis), yet it is never predicable of anything.
Other things, again, are both predicable of a subject and present in a
subject. Thus while knowledge is present in the human mind, it is
predicable of grammar.
There is, lastly, a class of things which are neither present in a subject
nor predicable of a subject, such as the individual man or the individual
horse. But, to speak more generally, that which is individual and has
the character of a unit is never predicable of a subject. Yet in some
cases there is nothing to prevent such being present in a subject. Thus a
certain point of grammatical knowledge is present in a subject.
Part 3
When one thing