The Campaigns of the British Army at Washington and New Orleans 1814-1815 | Page 6

believe that such a review
would not prove very interesting to the public in general. Enough is
done if I endeavour to impress my reader with as many of the feelings
which I then experienced, as may be done by detailing them; and, at the
same time, enable him to form some general idea of a place before
whose walls no trifling quantity of British blood has been spilt.
The city of Bayonne stands, as everybody knows, upon the Adour,
about six or eight miles from the point where that river falls into the sea.
On the southern or Spanish bank, where the whole of the city, properly
so called, is built, the country, to the distance of two or three miles
from the walls, is perfectly flat and the soil sandy, and apparently not
very productive. On the bank the ground rises rather abruptly from the
brink of the stream, sloping upwards likewise from the sea, till you
arrive at the pinnacle upon which the citadel is erected, and which
hangs immediately over the town. Thus, though the Adour in fact
separates the city from the suburbs and citadel, yet as the ramparts of
the former extend to the water's edge on both sides, and as those of the
latter continue the sweep from points immediately opposite, the general
appearance presented is that of one considerable town, with a broad
river flowing through the middle of it.
It will be seen, even from this short and imperfect sketch, that its
situation gives to Bayonne, considered as a military post, a superiority
over most cities; inasmuch as it affords peculiar facilities towards
rendering it a place of great strength. On one side there is a plain,

always accounted by engineers the most convenient for the construction
of fortifications; on the other an eminence, lofty enough to command
the surrounding country, and at the same time sufficiently level at the
summit to receive the walls of a fortress, powerful at once from its
position and regularity. But the great strength of Bayonne arose at this
juncture not so much from its original defences as from the numerous
outworks which had been lately added to it. It was along the course of
the Adour, as the reader will probably recollect, or rather between the
Adour and the Nieve, that Soult formed his famous intrenched camp.
The right of this chain of stupendous works rested upon the city, the
importance of which was consequently much increased; and as the
capture of it would have occasioned not only the loss of a town, but the
turning of the whole position, no pains were spared in rendering it as
nearly impregnable as possible. That I may convey some notion to the
minds of others of the nature of these works, I will describe the aspect
which they presented to myself, as I rode from Anglet towards the city.
When I had proceeded about a mile and a half beyond our advanced
posts, I found myself in front of the first line of defence. This consisted
of a battery mounting three eighteen-pounders, upon the road, flanked
by other batteries, one on each side; all so placed as that whichsoever
of them should be attacked, it might be defended by a cross-fire from
the rest. These were of course additionally strengthened by ditches and
felled trees; but they were open in the rear; and though very formidable
to an assailing party, yet, when taken, could have been of small service
to the conquerors, being themselves exposed to the fire of the second
line. The situation of the second line, again, was similar in every
respect to that of the first, being, like it, open in the rear, and placed
under the guns of the town. Thus, after having forced two powerful
lines of defence, the besiegers would find themselves almost as far as
ever from the attainment of their object, being then only arrived at the
point where the labours of a siege could commence.
But the maintenance of Bayonne must at all times depend upon keeping
possession of the citadel. The city lying upon a plain, and the castle
standing upon an eminence immediately above it, it is clear that, were
the latter taken, the former must either surrender or be speedily reduced

to ruins. It is true that, by destroying the bridge which connects them,
all communication between the two places would be cut off; but the
distance from the one to the other being not more than half-musket shot,
and the guns of the fort pointing directly down upon the streets and of
the city, any attempt to hold out could cause only the destruction of the
town, and the unavenged slaughter of its garrison. Of the truth of this
the French were as much aware