The Campaign of Chancellorsville | Page 9

intrench, and hold his ground as
obstinately as possible. If Lee retreated towards Gordonsville, he was
to harass him day and night. The Confederates had but five thousand
sabres to oppose him. "Let your watchword be, Fight! and let all your
orders be, Fight, Fight, FIGHT!" exclaimed enthusiastic Joe Hooker in
this order. The primary object was to keep the Confederates from
retreating to Richmond; and Stoneman was to rely on Hooker's being
up with him in six days, or before his supplies were exhausted. If
possible, he was to detach at the most available points parties to destroy
every thing in the direction of Charlottesville, and of the Pamunkey.
The Cavalry Corps, except Pleasonton's brigade, which accompanied
Hooker's headquarters during this movement, left on the 13th. On the
15th Stoneman threw a division across the river at Rappahannock
station, where the Orange and Alexandria Railroad crosses the river.
But a sudden rise in consequence of heavy rains obliged this division to
return by swimming the horses. Gen. Lee says, referring to this check,
that "their efforts to establish themselves on the south side of the river
were successfully resisted by Stuart." But the rise in the river was the
actual cause. There was no crossing of swords.
At the time the cavalry marched, an infantry brigade and a battery were
sent to Kelley's Ford, and a regiment to United-States Ford, to hold
these crossings against scouting parties, or any counter-demonstration
on the part of the enemy.
The river did not fall so that Stoneman could pass at that point until the
27th, when it was too late to accomplish valuable results under the

orders of the 12th; for the whole army was now on the march. Between
the 15th and 27th the cavalry, under instructions from Hooker,
remained in camp along the Orange and Alexandria Railroad.
It has, however, never been satisfactorily explained why it might not
have crossed higher up, and have utilized these precious two weeks. It
could not have been of less use than it was, and might possibly have
been able to call Stuart's entire force away from Lee's army. Nor was it
impossible, in part at least, to do the work cut out for it. Even to
threaten Lee's communications would have seriously affected the
singleness of purpose he displayed in this campaign.
But the operations of Stoneman, as they had no effect whatever upon
the manoeuvres of either Lee or Hooker, may be treated of separately,
as a matter almost apart from the one under consideration.
And thus, in the failure of the cavalry raid, miscarried the first effort of
this ill-fated campaign.
It is not often that the danger of detaching the entire cavalry force of an
army, for service at a distance from its infantry corps, is illustrated in
so marked a manner as it was on this occasion. Hooker left himself but
a small brigade, of four regiments and a horse-battery, to do the
scouting for an army of over one hundred thousand men. Had be
retained a sufficient force to march with the main body, there would no
doubt have been at least a brigade of it, instead of a few scouts, sent out
to near Old Wilderness Tavern and along the Orange plank road to the
junction of the Brock road. Jackson's movements would then have been
fully known.
The bulk of the cavalry of an army should be with the infantry corps
when in the presence of the enemy. For cavalry are the antennae of an
army.

VII.
THE FEINT BY THE LEFT WING.
Gen. Hooker's plan embraced, besides a cavalry raid to sever the
enemy's communications, a demonstration in force on the left to draw
the enemy's attention, and the throwing of the main body of his forces
across the river on the right.
As early as April 21, Doubleday of the First Corps had been sent down
the river to Port Conway with some thirty-five hundred men, to light

camp-fires, and make demonstrations with pontoons, after doing which
he returned to camp. On the 23d Col. Morrow, with the Twenty-fourth
Michigan, went down, and crossed the river to Port Royal in boats.
These demonstrations had been intended to co-operate with Stoneman's
raid, which at these dates should have been well on Lee's rear, and to
unsettle Lee's firm footing preparatory to the heavy blows Hooker was
preparing to deliver; but, as Stoneman was delayed, these movements
failed of much of their intended effect. Nevertheless, Jackson's corps
was drawn down to the vicinity, and remained there some days.
On Monday, April 27, Hooker issues his orders to the First, Third, and
Sixth Corps, to place themselves in position, ready to cross; the First at
Pollock's Mills Creek, and the Sixth at Franklin's Crossing, by 3.30
A.M., on