The Campaign of Chancellorsville | Page 5

was, after a few weeks,
succeeded by that most huge of all strategic jokes, the Mud March; and
Gen. Burnside retired from a position he had never sought, to the
satisfaction, and, be it said to his credit, with the warm personal regard,
of all. Sumner, whom the weight of years had robbed of strength, but
not of gallantry, was relieved at his own request; Franklin was shelved.
Hooker thus became senior general officer, and succeeded to the
command.
No man enjoyed a more enviable reputation in the Army of the
Potomac. He had forced himself upon its notice. From Bull Run, after
which action he is said to have remarked to Mr. Lincoln that he knew
more than any one on that field; through Williamsburg, where he so
gallantly held his own against odds during the entire day, and with
exhausted ammunition, until relieved by Kearney; before Richmond;
during the Seven Days; in the railroad-cutting at Manassas; at Antietam,
where he forced the fighting with so much determination, if not
wisdom, on the Union right; up to Fredericksburg, where, after a
personal protest to his commanding officer, he went in and fought his
troops "until he thought he had lost as many men as he was ordered to
lose,"--Hooker's character as man and soldier had been marked. His
commands so far had been limited; and he had a frank, manly way of
winning the hearts of his soldiers. He was in constant motion about the
army while it lay in camp; his appearance always attracted attention;
and he was as well known to almost every regiment as its own
commander. He was a representative man.
It is not astonishing that Mr. Lincoln, or the Washington pseudo-
strategists who were his military advisers, could not distinguish, in

selecting a chief who should be capable of leading the Army of the
Potomac to victory, between the gallant corps-commander, who
achieves brilliant results under limited responsibility, and the leader,
upon whose sole resources of mind and courage devolve not only the
instruction for health, equipment, rationing, march, or attack, of each of
his subordinates, but the graver weight of prompt and correct decision
and immediate action under every one of the kaleidoscopic changes of
a campaign or a battle-field. It required more knowledge of the
requisites of war, as well as a broader judgment of character, than Mr.
Lincoln had had opportunity to form of the several soldiers of the army,
to insure a happy choice.
And, doubtless, Hooker's self-assertiveness, success as a brigade,
division, and corps commander, and decided appearance of large ability,
shared equally in procuring his appointment. No one will deny
Hooker's capacity in certain directions, or up to a given test. His whole
career shows an exceptional power in "riding to orders." But he sadly
lacked that rare combination of qualities and reserve power necessary
to lead a hundred and twenty-five thousand men against such a foe as
Lee.
Nothing shows more curiously a weak spot in Hooker's character than
the odd pride he took in Mr. Lincoln's somewhat equivocal letter to him
at the time of his appointment, here following:--
EXECUTIVE MANSION, WASHINGTON, D.C., Jan. 26, 1863.
MAJOR-GEN. HOOKER.
General,--I have placed you at the head of the Army of the Potomac. Of
course, I have done this upon what appears to me to be sufficient
reasons, and yet I think it best for you to know that there are some
things in regard to which I am not quite satisfied with you. I believe
you to be a brave and skilful soldier, which of course I like. I also
believe you do not mix politics with your profession, in which you are
right. You have confidence in yourself; which is a valuable, if not an
indispensable, quality. You are ambitious, which, within reasonable
bounds, does good rather than harm; but I think that during Gen.
Burnside's command of the army, you have taken counsel of your
ambition, and thwarted him as much as you could, in which you did a
great wrong to the country and to a most meritorious and honorable
brother-officer. I have heard, in such way as to believe it, of your

recently saying that both the army and the Government needed a
dictator. Of course, it was not for this, but in spite of it, that I have
given you the command. Only those generals who gain success can set
up dictators. What I now ask of you is military success, and I will risk
the dictatorship. The Government will support you to the utmost of its
ability, which is neither more nor less than it has done or will do for all
commanders. I much fear that the spirit you have aided to infuse into
the army, of criticising their commander and withholding