The Campaign of Chancellorsville | Page 3

by either side, but of the calm skill with which Gen. Lee
wrested victory from a situation desperately compromised, and of the
genius of that greatest of his lieutenants, Thomas J. Jackson, who here
sealed with his blood his fidelity to the cause he loved so well.
It has been said that this campaign furnishes as much material for the
psychological as for the military student. And certainly nothing less
than a careful analysis of Hooker's character can explain the abnormal
condition into which his mental and physical energy sank during the
second act of this drama. He began with really masterly moves,
speedily placing his wary adversary at the saddest disadvantage. But,
having attained this height, his power seemed to pass away as from an
over-tasked mind. With twice the weight of arm, and as keen a blade,
he appeared quite unable to parry a single lunge of Lee's, quite unable
to thrust himself. He allowed his corps commanders to be beaten in
detail, with no apparent effort to aid them from his abundant resources,
the while his opponent was demanding from every man in his
command the last ounce of his strength. And he finally retired, dazed
and weary, across the river he had so ably and boastingly placed behind
him ten days before, against the opinion of nearly all his subordinates;
for in this case the conditions were so plain that even an informal
council of war advised a fight.
With character-study, however, this sketch has nothing to do. It is
confined to describing events, and suggesting queries for the curious in
military history.

II.

CONDITION OF THE COMBATANTS.
The first two years of civil strife had closed. The American people,
which so far had shown more aptness at learning than skill in waging
war, may be said to have passed through its apprenticeship in arms. The
broad plan of operations, intelligently but rudely conceived at the
outset by the greater spirits among our commanders, began to be more
clearly grasped. The political strategy of both contestants made
Virginia the field on which the left wing of the Federal armies pivoted,
while the right swung farther and farther south and east, and the
Confederates gallantly struggled for every foot of territory, yielding
only to the inexorable. This right wing had already possession of the
Mississippi as far south as Vicksburg, around which place Grant was
preparing to tighten his coils; it had occupied the line of the Tennessee
River, and had rendered useless to the Confederates the railroad from
Memphis to Chattanooga, which had been the great central artery
between Richmond and the trans-Mississippi States. The Southern
partisans, with Morgan and Forrest as typical chiefs, had up to this
period played, in the West especially, a very important part. They as
much exceeded our cavalry in enterprise as they had advantage over it
in knowledge of the country and in assistance from its population. They
had on more than one occasion tapped the too long and slender lines of
operation of our foremost armies. They had sent Grant to the right-
about from his first march on Vicksburg, thus neutralizing Sherman's
attempt at Chickasaw Bayou. They had compelled Buell to forfeit his
hardly-earned footing, and to fall back from the Tennessee River to
Louisville at the double-quick in order to beat Bragg in the race
towards the gate of the Northern States, which disaster was happily
soon retrieved by the latter's bloody check before Murfreesborough.
Yet, despite these back-sets, the general course of events showed that
Providence remained on the side of the heaviest battalions; and the
spring of 1863 saw our armies extended from the pivot midway
between the rival capitals in a more or less irregular line, and
interrupted by the Alleghany Mountains, to Vicksburg and the Father
of Waters.
Great as was the importance of success in Virginia, the Confederates
had appreciated the fact as had not the political soldiers at the head of
the Federal department of war. Our resources always enabled us to

keep more men, and more and better material, on this battle-ground,
than the Confederates could do; but this strength was constantly offset
by the ability of the Southern generals, and their independence of
action, as opposed to the frequent unskilfulness of ours, who were not
only never long in command, but were then tied hand and foot to some
ideal plan for insuring the safety of Washington. The political
conditions under which the Army of the Potomac had so far constantly
acted had never allowed it to do justice to its numbers, mobility, or
courage; while Mr. Lincoln, who actually assumed the powers of
commander-in-chief, technically intrusted to him by the Constitution,
was swayed to and fro by his own fears for the safety of his capital, and
by political